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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Promissory estoppel developed in order to protect reliance on a broken promise 
in the absence of a contract.1  Reliance lies at the core of the doctrine.  However, 
reliance necessarily implicates another core concept—trust.  The central importance 
of trust has been recognized by the courts, including the Michigan Supreme Court 
which observed,  “It is the value of trust that forms the basis of the entitlement to 
rely.”2  This paper examines the role of trust in promissory estoppel and the extent to 
which the law should protect trust when a promise is made.  In order to do so, 
however, an important distinction must be drawn between two types of trust: (1) 
interpersonal trust between the promisee and the promisor; and (2) the promisee’s 
trust that the promise will be enforced (which will be referred to as “enforcement 
trust” in this paper). 
Interpersonal trust is about the trust that one person (the promisee) reposes in 
another person (the promisor).  It is about the personal relationship between two 
people.  Trust in the enforceability of a promise, on the other hand, is about the trust 
that the promisee has in the legal system to enforce a promise.3  A promisee may 
                                                                
1Before the development of promissory estoppel, the law provided no remedy to plaintiffs 
like the widow in Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845), who relied to her detriment on a 
broken promise of support from her deceased husband’s brother.  No doubt in response to 
cases like this, the law evolved and developed into RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
90 (1981) , which provides:    
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.  The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.   
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under Subsection (1) 
without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance. 
2State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104, 107 (1993) (affirming finding of 
promissory estoppel in favor of borrowers against bank). 
3See Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial 
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 953 (1997). Professor 
DeLong has described the two types of trust as “performance reliance” and “enforcement 
reliance.”   
When a promisor makes a promise that the promisee recognizes to be unenforceable, 
the promise can induce only “performance reliance.”  The promisee relies solely on 
her estimate of the likelihood that the promisor will perform, without any expectation 
of a legal remedy if the reliance is disappointed.  The promisee decides whether and 
how much to rely by assessing the promisor’s honesty and reliability, the 
circumstances bearing on the probability of performance and breach, the benefits that 
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choose to rely on a promise even if she does not trust the promisor because she has 
trust that the legal system will provide a remedy for a broken promise. 4   
This distinction between the two types of trust is important because it frames the 
discussion concerning the extent to which promissory estoppel should protect a 
promisee.  This distinction also mirrors the difference between contract and promise, 
which was discussed in Professor Seana Shiffrin’s recent article in the Harvard Law 
Review.5  Professor Shiffrin observed that a “promise establishes rules for 
formalizing trust in interpersonal interactions; [while] contract establishes rules that 
help to enable a flourishing system of economic cooperation for mutual advantage.”6   
The protection of interpersonal trust is closely allied with the elevation of the role 
and protection of promise.  Those who exalt the importance of promise would argue 
that a promise is sacred and that a promisee’s trust in a promise and the promisor is 
entitled to the maximum level of protection.7  The protection of trust in the 
enforceability of a promise, on the other hand, expresses the view that a promise 
must rise to the level of contract in order to be enforced.   
Although interpersonal trust and enforcement trust are two distinct concepts, they 
are inextricably bound together (even in ways that appear contradictory).  For 
example, if the law’s goal is to protect a promisee’s trust in her promisor no matter 
what, it can be argued that the enforceability of a promise must be maximized.  At 
the same time, if the law’s goal is to encourage a promisee to rely on a promise made 
by someone she does not trust, the law must also provide maximum security of 
enforcement.  On the other hand, if the law’s goal is to cultivate trust and a 
promisee’s ability to decide whom to trust, it can be argued that the law should 
provide something less than maximum protection in order to prevent over-reliance 
by promisees on untrustworthy promisors.  Less than maximum protection places a 
burden on promisees to choose their promisors carefully.   And where does this 
                                                           
reliance followed by performance would confer, and the costs that disappointed 
reliance would impose.  
If . . . the promisor makes a promise that the promisee recognizes to be legally 
enforceable, then the promise will induce . . . “enforcement reliance.”  The promisee 
relies both on the credibility of the promise and on the belief that she will have a legal 
remedy for some or all of the costs of disappointed reliance if the promise is not 
performed. 
Id. 
4Throughout this Article, the promisee will be a woman or a business entity and the 
promisor will be a man or a business entity.  One commentator expressed the distinction in 
this manner:  “The legal enforceability of promises provides a ‘substitute source of 
reassurance’ for parties who do not have a preexisting trusting relationship.”  Anthony J. 
Bellia, Jr., Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 29 (2002). 
5Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
708, 710-11 (2007).  This work continues along the line developed by Professor Fried’s 
landmark work.  See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION (1981).   
6Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 711. 
7See Bellia, supra note 4, at 25. The themes of morality underlying promise is expressed 
by statements such as the following:  “By making a promise, a person invites another to trust, 
and to break a promise is to abuse that trust.” Id. 
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balance lie or where should it lie?  To what extent should the law protect 
interpersonal trust and trust in enforcement of a promise?  Such questions are the 
subject of this paper.   
The discussion of reliance overshadows the discussion of trust in the typical 
Contracts class.  Nonetheless, there is a school of thought that trust is so paramount 
and necessary in human interaction that the law should protect and promote trust, no 
matter what and no questions asked.  Indeed, a body of scholarly work has developed 
to promote the idea that the availability of promissory estoppel should be expanded 
in order to encourage complete trust in promisors and their promises.  One of the 
most advanced and cited works of this kind is an article from 1985 in the University 
of Chicago Law Review by Professors Farber and Matheson, who stated,  “Our 
proposed rule is simply that commitments made in furtherance of economic activity 
should be enforced.” 8  In proposing this rule, they argued against the need to show 
reliance because all that mattered in their view was the enforcement of the 
promisee’s trust in the promise.  They went so far as to state that the protection of 
trust is “the core concern of contract law.”9   
These are grand, sweeping statements.  If a complete stranger promises a 
business opportunity, should the law encourage the promisee to trust the promisor no 
matter what?  The Farber and Matheson view would answer, “Yes.”  It would also 
brush aside questions of the following sort:  What was the relationship between the 
promisor and the promisee?  Did the promisee have any reason to trust the promisor, 
other than the promisor’s promise?  Should the promisee have trusted the promisor?  
Instead of focusing on such questions, the Farber and Matheson view is that the 
promisee trusted the promisor, and that is that. 
Surprisingly, the notion of trust as an absolutely desirable trait or state seems to 
have gone unchallenged in large part.  It is as if trust is such an ideal virtue that it is 
beyond question.  This exaltation of trust as an unquestionable virtue, however, is 
contrary to common sense and universal human experience.  Parents strive to instill 
the notion of trust in their children.  Yet, all parents tell their children not to talk to 
                                                                
8Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and 
the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 929, 935 (1985).  Of course, their 
proposal did not become the prevailing doctrine.  Yet, despite the fact that Farber and 
Matheson wrote their article a generation ago, it has shown remarkable vitality.  Since January 
1, 2000, alone, it has been cited in at least thirty-nine law review articles and two judicial 
opinions. Their work can be viewed (from a historical perspective) as an effort to continue the 
expansion of promissory estoppel from its roots.  See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF 
CONTRACT 66 (1974). Professor Gilmore described this expansion, in its early days: 
In early judicial, and for that matter academic, discussions of [section] 90, there was a 
general assumption that the principle of [section] 90, however it should be described, 
should find its application mostly, if not entirely, in what might be called non-
commercial situations.  Judge Learned Hand once suggested that [section] 90, if it had 
any scope at all, which he was inclined to doubt, should be restricted to donative or 
gift promises.  Professionals should play the game according to professional rules.  If 
A, in a commercial context, made what could be described as an offer to B, then A’s 
liability to B should depend on the formal rules of offer, acceptance and consideration 
and on nothing else.  The course of decision has, however, seen a gradual expansion of 
[section] 90 as a principle of decision in a good many types of commercial situations. 
Id. 
9Farber & Matheson, supra note 8, at 935. 
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strangers—notwithstanding the importance of trust.  The reason is obvious.  There 
are limits that need to be placed on trust, and trust is not a pure good that should be 
promoted no matter what.  In fact, too much trust can be dangerous and destructive.  
Despite the shared intuitive understanding that trust should have its limits, there has 
been relatively little discussion as to where the limits should be drawn. 
To be sure, trust deserves protection.  However, this Article contends that the law 
should not engage in the maximum protection of interpersonal trust, but should 
instead concern itself with promoting and protecting an optimal level of trust.10  
Trust, no matter what and however much, should not be the focal point of judicial 
inquiry.  A promisee should not prevail simply because she trusted the promisor.  
Taken to its extremes, the literature seems to encourage contracting parties to engage 
in self-destructive acts of casual trust.  Instead, the law should ask whether the trust 
was reasonable and whether it was appropriate.  Those who engage in a reckless 
level of trust should not be protected.  The promotion of the optimal level can be 
justified on the basis of such disparate rationales as morality (at one end of a 
spectrum) and economic efficiency (at the other). 
The obvious question raised by this approach is how to determine the level of 
trust that should trigger judicial protection.  This Article proposes a modest solution.  
It attempts to establish the endpoints of the continuum along which interpersonal 
trust should be evaluated.  At one end are the situations where trust should be 
entitled to maximum protection.  At the opposite end are the situations where trust 
should not be protected, and, indeed, should be discouraged. 
Part II of this Article summarizes some of the scholarship discussing the nature 
and role of trust.  In particular, it discusses the role of trust in a market economy, and 
the related role of trust in Contracts law.  Part III examines whether there is a 
difference between trust and reliance, and whether it matters.  To put it differently, 
does a discussion of trust add anything to what has already been generated by the 
literature’s discussion of reliance?  Part III further asserts that a separate discussion 
of trust is beneficial because it has the potential to guide and inform internal 
decision-making in a way that is not possible by simply focusing on outward 
reliance.  Part IV of this Article discusses the role of trust in the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel.  Among other things, it reviews the scholarly literature’s 
incorporation of trust into the promissory estoppel analysis, and examines the 
intertwined relationship of trust and reliance.   
Part V sets forth why the law should promote an optimal level of trust, as 
opposed to a maximum protection of trust no matter what.  It discusses the need for 
                                                                
10The focus on the “optimal level of trust” requires further clarification.  A necessary 
question is whether the optimal level refers to the level of trust within an individual promisee 
or whether it refers to a level of trust at a macro or societal level.  This Article is based on the 
premise that promoting the optimal level at the individual level leads to an aggregation of 
effects resulting in the optimal level at the societal level.  At the individual level, the level of a 
trust can certainly be optimized because one can choose to trust someone a lot or a little.  One 
can choose to trust another, but have back-up plans just in case.  One can choose to trust 
another in some matters but not in others.  See Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive 
Theory of Trust, 84 Wash. U. L.Rev. 1717 (2006).    By identifying the circumstances in 
which trust should be protected by the law from the circumstances where it should not, the 
goal is to provide boundaries to guide the optimum level of trust at the individual level with 
the goal of improving it at the societal level as well.   
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promisees to exercise self-reliance and self-protection in order to avoid overreliance.  
To guide the determination of the optimal level of trust, this Article suggests that the 
protection of trust should be viewed along a spectrum with one end being defined by 
the cases where trust should be protected to the maximum extent and with the polar 
opposite end being defined by cases where trust deserves no protection. 11  Part VI 
identifies the types of cases where trust should be protected.  Such cases include ones 
where the promisee is engaged in a transaction that she cannot avoid, where she has 
no control over the structure of the transaction, and where she has no choice but to 
trust the promisor (or more accurately, trust the legal system to enforce the promise).  
This Part includes a discussion of cases involving insurers and insureds.  Another 
type of case where trust should be protected includes cases where the parties have 
developed a long-standing, pre-existing relationship to the point where the promisee 
has developed a reasonable basis to trust that the promisor will act in a manner 
consistent with that relationship.   
Part VII presents the polar end of the spectrum where trust should not be 
protected.  This part proposes that trust should not be protected if: (1) the promisee 
could have determined that the promisor was untrustworthy at a low cost to the 
promisee; or (2) if the promisee could have avoided the harm resulting from a broken 
promise by taking preventive measures that cost less than the amount of the potential 
harm.  This part includes a detailed discussion of Universal Computer Systems v. 
Medical Services Ass’n of Pennsylvania,12 which this Article contends may be the 
most wrongly decided promissory estoppel case ever.  It also includes a discussion of 
the role of lawyers concerning a promisee’s self-reliance.  Part VIII concludes the 
Article. 
In summary, this Article does not promote or encourage trust to the maximum 
limits.  However, trust is not the only societal interest that deserves protection under 
the promissory estoppel doctrine.  There are other equally deserving and meritorious 
interests, such as: (1) an interest in discouraging naïve, self-destructive behavior—
i.e., blind trust; (2) an interest in avoiding misallocation of resources caused by 
overreliance and misplaced trust; and (3) an interest in avoiding the waste, 
disappointment and rancor caused by broken promises and lawsuits—in other words, 
                                                                
11This Article’s approach is open to the legitimate criticism that the situations described by 
the endpoints comprise only a small percentage of promissory estoppel cases, and that the 
proposed analytical framework is of limited value for the vast majority of such cases.  
Nonetheless, there should be some value in setting endpoints so that comparisons can be made 
as to whether a particular fact situation is closer to one or the other.  Whatever the limitations 
of the proposal, it does aspire to Llewellyn’s standards for a rule of law. 
The ideal rule of law in case-law will be that which  
(1) fits rather accurately the actual recorded outcome of a rather consistent body of 
cases examined as cases, on facts and result; and  
(2) is announced in those cases as the rule; and  
(3) appeals today as leading to a just result; and therefore  
(4) offers real hope of appealing to present day courts; and so of guiding them with 
some sureness; and so of affording a counsellor a moderately accurate prediction, and 
an advocate a solid basis of case-planning. 
K.N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243, 1256 
(1938). 
12Universal Computer Systems, Inc. v. Med. Ass’n of Pa., 628 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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parties would be better off avoiding bad situations, as opposed to trying to sort out in 
a courtroom the aftermath of an unfortunate act of misplaced trust.13   
II.  THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF TRUST 
What is trust and what purpose does it serve?  Scholars have utilized a variety of 
approaches to address the subject. 14  It has been approached from disciplines as 
varied as psychology,15 anthropology,16 evolutionary biology,17 and economics.18  
This Article does not endorse or reject any particular approach, and instead discusses 
trust in an agnostic manner designed to reflect the common understanding that would 
be recognized in any court.  With regard to interpersonal trust, the following 
                                                                
13See Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 
YALE L.J. 343, 383 (1969). There are undoubtedly other factors as well, and any proposed 
formula will necessarily be imprecise and need to be flexible. 
The granting of relief under Section 90 depends ultimately upon a judgment that 
enforcement is necessary to avoid injustice.  Such a requirement serves as a reminder 
that not all promisees who suffer reliance injuries are entitled to the protections of the 
section.  More important, the notion that justice determines the limits of responsibility 
means that promissory estoppel is informed by a basic test of fairness.  The doctrine 
thus allows courts wide latitude in redistributing losses resulting from unfilled 
promises.  At the same time, it must be recognized that the very flexibility of Section 
90 prevents its reduction to a precise formula or series of tests. 
Id. See also Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of 
the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 497 (1950) (making a similar observation earlier in the 
century). 
In addition, we can expect an attempt on the part of some courts to formalize the fact-
situations which they will recognize as creating injustice.  While judicial recognition 
of hardship and injustice as a reason for enforcing a gratuitous promise is necessary if 
promissory estoppel is to develop and mature, formalization or the confining of its use 
to a few specific situations is neither necessary nor desirable.  Should that occur, 
promissory estoppel would become as mechanical as the jurisprudence of which 
Pound once complained.  Rather, it is to be hoped that fluidity in the application of the 
concept will be maintained so that injustice may be avoided whenever it is 
encountered in connection with the gratuitous promises here discussed. 
Id. 
14This Article is not intended to serve as an in-depth examination of the nature of trust.  
For those interested in reviewing the scholarship in this area, the works cited in the Hill & 
O’Hara article, supra note 10, provide a good start.  In addition, the entirety of Numbers 2 and 
3 of Volume 81 of the Boston University Law Review is devoted to the  subject of trust, with 
articles from scholars within and from outside the legal academy.  See Symposium, Trust 
Relationships, 81 B.U. L. REV. 321 (2001). 
15See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social 
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361 (2001).  
16See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 495, 504 (2001) (citing 
anthropological studies of trust in societies in Pakistan, Oman, and the American South).  
17See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1753 n. 35 (2001). 
18See, e.g., Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L. 
REV. 523 (2001). 
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definition utilized by Professors Hill and O’Hara is accessible and sensible.  “Trust 
experts all seem to agree that trust is a state of mind that enables its possessor to be 
willing to make herself vulnerable to another—that is, to rely on another despite a 
positive risk that the other will act in a way that can harm the truster.”19  This 
definition is helpful for several reasons.  It highlights the subjective, internal nature 
of trust.  It also points out that trust involves at least two people, the self and other, 
and the process by which the self reaches out to another.  It also emphasizes the fact 
that trust involves risk and vulnerability, and that trust poses the potential of a 
dangerous downside.   
It necessarily follows that trust implicates personal judgment.  Indeed, a powerful 
indicator of judgment is whether one is able to tell the difference between someone 
who should be trusted and someone who should be distrusted.  The intertwined 
concepts of trust and judgment are so powerful that human accomplishments are 
measured by them.  The important point is that the law should be wary and tread 
carefully in this area because the establishment of poor standards or misdirected 
incentives has the potential to interfere with the development of the most important 
personal qualities, and such poor standards or misdirected incentives have the 
potential to channel behavior toward regrettable or self-destructive ends. 
Notwithstanding the potential dangers and downside of trust, it is equally and 
obviously true that trust provides the possibilities for benefits and advantages.   
When my confidence in your assistance derives from my conviction that 
you will do what is right (not just what is prudent), then I trust you, and 
trust becomes a powerful tool for our working our mutual wills in the 
world.  So remarkable a tool is trust that in the end we pursue it for its 
own sake; we prefer doing things cooperatively when we might have 
relied on fear or interest or worked alone.20 
The benefits of trust can be explained by examining the harm caused by distrust. 
Distrust in a world in which others are untrustworthy does, of course, 
protect one against losses that would follow from taking the risk of 
cooperating with others.  But it can wreck one’s own opportunities in a 
society or context in which others generally are trustworthy.  The 
meaningful result of trust, when it is justified, is to enable cooperation; the 
result of distrust is to block even the attempt at cooperation.  Trust is 
functional in a world in which trust pays off; distrust is functional in a 
world in which trust does not pay off.21 
                                                                
19Hill & O’Hara, supra note 10, at 1724.  Two other professors also described trust along 
similar lines.   
First, trust involves at least two actors—the actor who trusts and the actor who is 
trusted.  Second, the trusting actor must deliberately make herself vulnerable to the 
trusted actor in circumstances in which the trusted actor could benefit from taking 
advantage of the trusting actor’s vulnerability.  Third, the trusting actor must make 
herself vulnerable in the belief or expectation that the trusted actor will in fact behave 
“trustworthily” – that is, refrain from exploiting the trusting actor’s vulnerability.   
Blair & Stout, supra note 17, at 1745-46. 
20FRIED, supra note 5, at 8. 
21Hardin, supra note 16, at 503. 
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Distrust is about a world marked by isolation and suspicion.  In such a world, 
aspirations and development will necessarily be limited because people will be 
unwilling to pursue ventures that might lead to gains greater than the sum of the 
individual contributions.  It is for this reason that trust is a subject of economic 
concern.  
A.  The Role of Trust in a Market Economy 
There are numerous reasons why trust should be encouraged.  One recurring 
theme in the literature focuses on the importance of trust for a modern, market 
economy.22  As one observer put it:  “[O]ne of the fundamental psychological 
conditions for the successful coordination of complex commercial transaction [is] 
interpersonal trust.”23  Professors Farber and Matheson added:  
Up until this point, relationships characterized by interdependence and 
thus by a need for trust have been described as though they were 
exceptional.  This description could not be further from the truth.  The 
network of interdependence in modern economic relations extends far 
beyond the ongoing relationship between specific parties to the very 
structure of the modern economy.  Modern economic relations are 
dependent upon institutions which themselves are based on trust.  The 
firm, an essential economic unit, can function only if employees and 
                                                                
22There is also the theme based on moralistic prescriptions. See FRIED, supra note 5, at 16-
17. 
The obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of utility but in respect 
for individual autonomy and in trust.  Autonomy and trust are grounds for the 
institution of promising as well, but the argument for individual obligation is not the 
same.  Individual obligation is only a step away, but that step must be taken.  An 
individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked 
a convention whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to 
expect the promised performance.  To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to 
invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite.  To abuse that confidence now is 
like (but only like) lying: the abuse of a shared social institution that is intended to 
invoke the bonds of trust.  A liar and a promise-breaker each use another person.  In 
both speech and promising there is an invitation to the other to trust, to make himself 
vulnerable; the liar and the promise-breaker then abuse that trust.  The obligation to 
keep a promise is thus similar to but more constraining than the obligation to tell the 
truth.  To avoid lying you need only believe in the truth of what you say when you say 
it, but a promise binds into the future, well past the moment when the promise is 
made.  There will, of course, be great social utility to a general regime of trust and 
confidence in promises and truthfulness.  But this just shows that a regime of mutual 
respect allows men and women to accomplish what in a jungle of unrestrained self-
interest could not be accomplished.  If this advantage is to be firmly established, there 
must exist a ground for mutual confidence deeper than and independent of the social 
utility it permits. 
Id. See also Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 811 (1941). The 
focus on the moral aspect seems to have been reflected in Professor Fuller’s earlier 
observation that the cases under Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts “are not 
‘upholding transactions’ but healing losses caused through broken faith.” Id. 
23G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: 
Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 225 (1991). 
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employer have at least limited trust in each other.  Markets for goods can 
exist only if sellers normally can be trusted to make future deliveries of 
nondefective products.  Insurance, credit, and investment can exist only 
when the other party generally can be trusted to pay.24 
The need for trust in an economy is easy to overlook because of its intangible 
nature.  Yet without it, many transactions that are taken for granted could not be 
completed or even entered.  People need one another because people stopped being 
self-sufficient centuries ago—individuals do not, as a general rule, grow their own 
food or make their own clothes.  Trust enables economic actors to enter into 
transactions with each other.  The ability to obtain goods and services from others is 
rooted in trust. 
1. The Importance of Trust at the Macro-Economic Level 
The importance of trust to a market economy can be seen at both the macro-
economic level and the micro-economic level of the firm.  At the macro level, trust is 
an essential element.  Indeed, the ability to trust strangers is what distinguishes 
primitive, tribal-based economies from modern, free-market economies.  This 
transition from primitive to modern economic structures was observed in the 
nineteenth century as it was occurring.25  The ability to move beyond transactions 
                                                                
24Farber & Matheson, supra note 8, at 927. See also DeLong, supra note 3, at 950, n. 23.  
Along similar lines, Professor DeLong added:  “Most scholars agree that bargain promises are 
legally enforced in order to increase the gains available through trade.  Enforceability 
encourages promisees to enter into bargain contracts by reducing their risk of disappointed 
reliance.”  Id. 
25See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTIONS WITH THE EARLY HISTORY 
OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 172-73 (London, J. Murray 1920) (1866). 
The movement of progressive societies has been uniform in one respect.  Through all 
its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency, 
and the growth of individual obligation in its place.  The Individual is steadily 
substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take account . . . . Nor is it 
difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those 
forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family.  It is 
Contract.  Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in 
which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem 
to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations 
arise from the free agreement of Individuals. 
Id.  
Maine went on to state: 
All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of Persons were derived from, and 
to some extent are still coloured [sic] by, the powers and privileges anciently residing 
in the Family.  If then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage of the best writers, 
to signify these personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such 
conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the 
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to 
Contract. 
Id. at 173-74. 
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limited to people who are personally known to one another to transactions with 
people with no prior relationship is a necessary condition of modern economic life.26   
This movement away from an economy based on family or tribal relationships to 
a modern economy is based, in large part, on trust.  Here, the discussion is more 
about enforcement trust rather than interpersonal trust.  In the absence of an ability to 
trust strangers, business relationships and economic activity are confined to a tightly-
circumscribed group.27  Such limits obviously place significant constraints on the 
ability of an economy to expand.  In order to move beyond trust confined to a circle 
of intimates, the ability to trust that the legal system will enforce promises made by 
strangers takes on added and obvious importance.  The confidence of a promisee in 
enforcement trust may be the necessary catalyst to enable her to make the leap of 
faith to rely on a stranger’s promise.  The importance of trust to a modern economy 
provides an easy explanation as to why the legal enforcement of trust would become 
important in a country spanning a continent and whose citizens did not descend from 
                                                                
26See Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and 
Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1521-22 (2006). This 
distinction between undeveloped and advanced economies was the subject of this recent article 
which discussed the work of Nobel Laureate Douglass North: 
North first identifies self-enforcement as the primary feature of contracts used in 
tribes, primitive societies, and close-knit small communities—settings in which 
personal knowledge of transacting parties about one another is extensive, and repeat 
dealings are pervasive.  North then points out the limits of self-enforcing contracts in a 
world of increasing impersonal exchange.  In such a world, simultaneous exchange 
and repeat dealings are no longer the prevailing norm; thus, self-enforcing contracts 
become insufficient because there no longer exists a dense social network of 
interaction to enable transacting to take place at low cost. 
Id.  
The analysis added: 
One particular understanding of this assessment by North in contemporary 
development studies is that as developing countries’ economies become more fully 
integrated into the larger global economy, formal contract enforcement mechanisms 
assume a larger significance.  North explains that ‘third-party enforcement’ means 
“the development of the state as a coercive force able to monitor property rights and 
enforce contracts effectively.” 
Id. at 1522. 
27Hill & O’Hara, supra note 10, at 1739.  In their article, Professors Hill and O’Hara 
pointed to a study of Chinese rubber dealers who limited their dealings to: (in order of 
priority) nuclear family; extended family; clansmen; fellow villagers; other Chinese who 
spoke the same dialect; Chinese who spoke another dialect; and, finally, non-Chinese.  Id. at 
1739-40.  They established this priority because of their inability to rely on legal mechanisms 
to enforce trust.  Id.  To anyone who believes that the importance of tribes is merely a matter 
of historical interest limited to pre-twentieth century history, a cursory glance at the daily news 
stories (especially from other parts of the world like Gaza, Iraq, Nigeria, and Somalia) should 
amply demonstrate that tribalism remains a powerful force and provides the contextual 
explanation for many current events.  It is also interesting to note that Maine’s observation is 
confirmed in that there is an inverse relationship between the strength of tribalism in a society, 
on the one hand, and the rule of law and the strength of contract law, on the other. See MAINE, 
supra note 25 at 173-74. To the extent that a reader may interpret the preceding as a value 
judgment, such a judgment is purely the creation of the reader and not the Author.   
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a common tribe, region, or religion.28  Thus, trust (and the protection of trust) serves 
an important economic and social function.29  Formal legal mechanisms are therefore 
necessary to encourage and protect trust as a society moves from an economy 
dominated by transactions between parties who know one another to an economy 
dominated by transactions between strangers.  This ability to trust enables an 
economy to grow exponentially beyond the limits imposed when transactions are 
confined to closely-related parties. 
2.  The Importance of Trust at the Micro-Economic Level 
Trust (the interpersonal kind) also serves a vital role at the micro-economic level 
of the firm.  It serves to harmonize interpersonal dealings among actors within the 
firm, and between actors within the firm and those outside. 
Where trust can be harnessed, it can substantially reduce the inefficiencies 
associated with both agency and team production relationships.  Trust 
permits transactions to go forward on the basis of a handshake rather than 
a complex formal contract; it reduces the need to expend resources on 
constant monitoring of employees and business partners; and it avoids the 
uncertainty and expense associated with trying to enforce formal and 
informal agreements in the courts.30 
                                                                
28Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 
1373, 1376 (1984). Professor Feinman addressed the role of social and economic needs in the 
development of Contracts law and the promotion of trust.  
The functional approach, on the other hand, posits a strong causal relation between 
social needs and legal development.  The interests and needs of a society, especially in 
its economic aspects, generate strong pressure on the form and content of contract law.  
Without necessarily resorting to crude determinism, advocates of this approach stress 
the extent to which contract law responds to forces external to the legal system and 
downplay its purely internal intellectual development. 
The functional approach contemplates that, in any society in which economic 
exchange is significantly developed, a large number of transactions will occur without 
the precision envisioned by the classical formation/bargain consideration model.  In an 
economic exchange, the absence of the discrete bargain or the precise agreement 
required by the classical model should not prevent the enforcement of a promise that 
induces foreseeable reliance.  Enforcement in those cases serves a variety of social 
needs, such as the promotion of trust and of transactional security, and therefore 
facilitates exchange. 
Id.  
29Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 555 (2001). From a different 
angle, Professor Ribstein argues that laws designed to enforce trust may actually undermine 
trust because they substitute reliance on formal, legal mechanisms to regulate behavior over a 
stronger form of trust developed through personal relationships. Id.  
30Blair & Stout, supra note 17, at 1757. See also Farber & Matheson, supra note 8, at 928. 
Professors Farber and Matheson made similar observations: 
Because trust is essential to our basic economic institutions, it is a public good.  One 
individual breaking trust in a dramatic way, or many individuals breaking trust less 
dramatically, can lead to short-run benefits for those individuals but create negative 
externalities.  The willingness of others to trust is impaired, requiring them to invest in 
precautions or insure themselves against the increased risk of betrayal.  Such 
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Interpersonal trust also serves to reduce transaction costs – a holy grail of 
economic efficiency theories.  It overcomes the barriers of wariness and suspicion, 
and permits transactions to proceed on their merits. 
The awkwardness or expense of more formal means of assuring reciprocal 
exchange motivate parties to seek other ways of constructing cooperative 
bargaining relationships.  The basis of all alternatives is one of the most 
fragile, yet powerful human dispositions—interpersonal trust.  Parties 
prefer to deal on trust because it lowers the transaction costs inherent in 
the alternative approach of bargaining based on mutual suspicion.  
Moreover, trust signals that postcontractual relationships with the same or 
future partners can be based on mutually beneficial understanding and 
flexibility rather than on strict adherence to legal rights and contract 
terms.31 
Thus, trust reduces financial costs and delays in time.  While the benefits may be 
difficult to measure, their existence is intuitive and obvious. 
B.  The Role of Trust in Contracts 
Because of the role of trust in social and economic relationships, the Law of 
Contracts encourages and enforces trust.  In addition to describing the protection of 
trust as “the core concern of contract law,”32 Professors Farber and Matheson also 
stated:  “[T]he underlying legal policy is to protect the ability of individuals to trust 
promises in circumstances in which that trust is socially beneficial.”33  If the law did 
not protect trust, contracts would be undermined.  “For if losses were truly to be 
allowed to lie where they fall, then no contract would ever be enforced.  If somebody 
ended up losing because he trusted in the promise of another, why the more fool 
he!”34  The bottom line is that the role and presence of trust (interpersonal trust and 
enforcement trust) is intertwined with the law of Contracts and cannot be separated.   
A further and more important set of questions (for purposes of this Article) is 
how does trust develop and how should trust develop?  Common understanding tells 
us that trust develops over time and over a course of dealing between people.  As a 
general matter, people do not say or think, “Hello, I’m so and so.  It’s nice to meet 
you.  You just made me a promise.  I will trust you.”  Usually, it requires more for 
                                                           
externalities exist because of asymetrical information: the promisor necessarily has 
better information about his own trustworthiness than does the promisee.  For 
example, in the short run employers can profit by making commitments to employees, 
obtaining the resulting benefits, and then reneging.  But in the long run, enforcement 
benefits promisors as a group by fostering the reliance from which they seek to 
benefit.  Conversely, trustworthy individuals confer a social benefit by increasing the 
general perception of trust, thereby allowing others to decrease such costs. 
Id.  
31Shell, supra note 23, at 255. 
32Farber & Matheson, supra note 8, at 935. 
33Id. at 905.  See also FRIED, supra note 5, at 83.  Along similar lines, Professor Fried 
added, “In general we can get the social, collective benefits of trust only if we are faithful for 
the sake of trust itself, not just for the sake of the resulting benefits.”  Id. 
34Id. at 65. 
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trust to build.  If one accepts this description, should the law reflect common 
behavioral practice or should the law intervene to accelerate the development of 
trust?  Should the state intervene to push private conduct in a direction it might not 
otherwise go?  The advocates of maximum trust protection would answer yes.  This 
Article takes a contrary view.    
III.  IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRUST  AND RELIANCE, AND, IF THERE IS, 
DOES IT MATTER? 
At this point, a few foundational questions should be addressed:  Is there a 
difference between trust and reliance, or are they interchangeable?  Even if there is 
some difference in meaning, does it matter for Contracts?  What, if anything, is 
gained by focusing on trust in the application of promissory estoppel, as opposed to 
reliance alone?  Despite the synonymous relationship between the words, this Article 
submits that there is a difference and that the difference is important because it is 
about a party’s ability to make appropriate decisions and to choose beneficial 
relationships.35 
                                                                
35See Farber & Matheson, supra note 8, at 945. The Farber and Matheson article draws a 
distinction between trust and reliance:   
Based on our survey of recent promissory estoppel cases, we believe that promissory 
estoppel is losing its link with reliance.  In key cases promises have been enforced 
with only the weakest showing of any detriment to the promisee.  Reliance-based 
damages are the exception, not the rule.  With the decline of reliance, promissory 
estoppel is moving away from tort law.  It has become a means of enforcing promises 
differing in doctrinal detail from traditional contract law but sharing a common goal.  
That goal, we have argued, is to foster trust between economic actors.  Trust is a moral 
good, but it is also an economic asset.  It allows coordination and planning between 
economic actors and fosters the formation of valuable economic institutions. 
Perhaps in an earlier age traditional contract law was adequate to foster the degree of 
trust society needed in economic activities.  Today, an increasingly interdependent 
society needs to foster trust in a variety of relationships not readily organized through 
the device of the formal contract.  Promissory estoppel is one of several mechanisms 
courts have used to try to close what we have called the "relational gap" in contract 
law. 
Id.  
This passage illustrates the decoupling of trust from reliance.  It suggests that trust should 
be encouraged and protected without regard to reliance.  This view, of course, places the 
weight of the law behind the enforcement of the promise, and is consistent with Professor 
Fried’s views as expressed in his book, Contract as Promise. See generally FRIED, supra note 
5.  See also Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 
111, 121 (1991).   
Fried explains much of contract law in terms of the moral obligation of promise.  His 
primary focus is on the promisor, who has an interest in requiring that promises be 
kept so that others will take her at her word.  By enforcing contracts, the legal system 
supports principles of trust and integrity. 
Id.   
Thus, the use of the word “trust” in the literature is not synonymous with “reliance.”  
Indeed, trust is used to urge the primacy of promise over reliance. 
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A.  The Subjective Nature of Trust versus the Objective Nature of Reliance 
Some dictionary definitions suggest the absence of any difference between trust 
and reliance.  For example, the online version of the Oxford English Dictionary uses 
one to define the other.  It defines trust as: “Confidence in or reliance on some 
quality or attribute of a person or thing, or the truth of a statement.”36  The online 
version of the American Heritage Dictionary suggests a more nuanced distinction, 
however.  It provides:  “Rely implies complete confidence. . . . Trust stresses 
confidence arising from belief that is often based on inconclusive evidence.”37     
This latter definition suggests several layers of difference between the two.  Trust 
can be viewed as an internal, subjective state of mind, while reliance can be viewed 
as an objectively verifiable act.  This observation also leads to the corollary 
proposition that trust and reliance occupy different positions on a temporal 
continuum.  It may be the case that the development of trust must precede reliance.  
Accordingly, trust might be viewed as a precursor or condition to reliance.38  Thus, 
the movement from trust to reliance is (in part) a movement in time and a movement 
from internal to external, subjective to objective.  Moreover, the existence of trust 
can only be proven to the extent that it manifests itself in reliance. 
B.  Reliance as an Ex Post Judicial Inquiry versus Trust as an Individual Ex Ante 
Process 
The observation that the movement from trust to reliance is a movement in time 
and a movement from subjective to objective leads to a further observation that is 
central to the legal analysis.  The focus on reliance is exclusively about the ex post 
judicial inquiry as to whether the promisee’s conduct was reasonable.  In other 
words, the examination of reliance is about a court reviewing a record after the fact.  
At that point, the individual has been removed from the process; the process has been 
thrown into the hands of the lawyers and the court.  The conduct constituting the 
reliance has already occurred, and the court is determining whether such conduct was 
reasonable under an objective standard.   
An examination of trust focuses on a different moment in time and a different 
stage in the process.  It is about the ex ante decision made by the individual before 
reliance occurs.  The formation of trust is a private matter.  It is the point when the 
promisee, alone in her conscience, decides whether to engage in conduct that 
objectively constitutes reliance.  There is no judicial involvement at that point, and 
no external inquiry imposing objective, judgmental standards.  The promisee has not 
yet crossed the point of no return between the subjective/objective divide.  Thus, the 
examination of trust takes place at a different stage than an examination of reliance. 
                                                                
36See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 402 (2d ed. 1989), available at 
http://dictionary.oed.com.  
37See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1475 (4th ed. 
2000), available at http://www.bartleby.com/61. 
38This Article does not assume or suggest that trust must always and necessarily 
accompany reliance.  It is, of course, possible for reliance to occur without trust.  As an 
extreme example, a prisoner must rely on his jailer—whether trust exists is another matter.  
Nonetheless, because this Article is about the law of Contracts, it deals with consensual 
relationships. 
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C.  The Value of a Focus on Trust 
Because trust is about the individual ex ante decision-making process, an 
examination of trust presents the opportunity to guide and inform behavior.  
Nonetheless, a focus on trust presents its own set of unique analytical challenges.  As 
learned by many students in their first week of law school, the law of Contracts is 
based on the “objective theory of contract.”39  Given the law’s emphasis on objective 
standards, it may seem a bit surprising that trust, a subjective state of mind, has been 
(or should be) the subject of judicial and scholarly attention.  Despite the law’s 
emphasis on objective criteria, trust merits examination because of its relationship to 
conduct.   
Under ideal circumstances, the decision to trust is about the full exercise of 
personal autonomy.  It is at the heart of the moment when one decides to move 
beyond oneself to reach out to another.  It should be the result of a reflective and 
deliberate internal calculus informed by experience.  To the extent the law 
encourages trust no matter what, it undermines this process and removes the 
cautionary burden of self-reliance and self-restraint from a promisee.  The focus on 
trust is therefore, in part, about the appropriate level of the law’s influence on, 
involvement with or interference in personal, private decision-making.  By 
concentrating on the moment when the decision is being made whether to act in 
reliance, the law can influence whether trust, a subjective state of mind, ripens into 
reliance or an enforceable transaction, both objective acts.  This would add more 
incentive for the law’s need to examine trust because it is at that formational stage 
where the decision to rely is made.   
A different way to analyze the importance of trust is to ask whether there is any 
point to discussing anything other than reasonable reliance.  After all, Section 90 is 
concerned with reasonable reliance, so why move beyond that to examine trust?  
However, if one accepts the premise that law should guide, affect or improve 
behavior, then there are theoretical and practical benefits to examining trust.  To that 
end, an understanding of a person’s internal state is helpful, and perhaps necessary, 
to guiding external conduct.  Although stated in the context of examining the role of 
emotion in the law, the following observation is equally applicable to a discussion of 
trust: “Understanding the nature of emotion has practical, not merely theoretical, 
value.  Emotions motivate behavior.  Accordingly, if we have an interest in affecting 
the behavior of another person—whether a child, a student, or a fellow citizen—we 
should also take an interest in that person’s emotional life.”40  There is little 
                                                                
39See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 27 (5th ed. 2003) (“[B]oth the rhetoric and the actions of courts and writers have 
stressed an ‘objective theory’ of contract obligation, by which one is ordinarily bound or not 
bound, not by her ‘secret intent’ to that effect, but by the reasonable interpretation of her 
words and actions.”).  The objective theory of contract is, of course, traceable back to the 
articulation of the theory by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., that the “making of a contract 
depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets 
of external signs—not on the parties’ having meant the same thing but on their having said the 
same thing.”  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 
(1897).  
40Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 297-98 (1996). 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss1/4
2008] PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND INTERPERSONAL TRUST 53 
educational value to telling someone to engage or not engage in certain outward 
behavior without also explaining the underlying reasoning.  There is a moral and 
educational emptiness to an approach that only addresses conduct. 
There is a great deal of room for debate as to how and whether public 
education and public policy should be used to shape the emotional 
evaluations that citizens form; many people do think that the only correct 
focus for law is behavior, and that, so far as the law is concerned, the 
person who effectively suppresses hatred is on a par with the person who 
ceases to hate . . . . Most of us would not be very satisfied with teachers 
who ruled racist behavior off-limits but failed to teach the falsity of the 
beliefs about African-Americans that underlie much racial prejudice and 
hatred, allowing their students to persist in those appraisals.41 
To borrow this thought, the person who is concerned only with reasonable 
reliance, without an understanding of trust, is not necessarily on a par with the 
person who knows whom to trust and when to trust.  It is more likely that the latter 
will be better able to avoid unfortunate situations.  This is why trust, by itself, merits 
examination and discussion. 
With specific reference to the law of Contracts, Professor Shiffrin observed:   
For instance, if contract law’s aim were to protect against harm suffered 
from breach of promise, measured in terms of reasonable reliance, what 
                                                                
41Id. at 300. Professors Kahan and Nussbaum laid the foundation for their views by 
highlighting the difference between the mechanistic view of emotion as opposed to the 
evaluative view: 
The mechanistic conception sees emotions as forces that do not contain or respond to 
thought; it is correspondingly skeptical about both the coherence of morally assessing 
emotions and the possibility of shaping and reshaping persons’ emotional lives.  The 
evaluative conception, in contrast, holds that emotions express cognitive appraisals, 
that these appraisals can themselves be morally evaluated, and that persons 
(individually and collectively) can and should shape their emotions through moral 
education. 
Id. at 273.   
Whether one holds one view or the other determines whether one believes in the 
possibility of improvement or not. Those with a mechanistic view hold a pessimistic view of 
improvement.  “But most versions of the mechanistic view hold out little hope that 
conditioning will render the emotions governable:  thus they always focus on the need to 
cultivate mechanisms of suppression and indulgence as the primary devices to control 
emotion.”  Id. at 298. Those with an evaluative view hold an optimistic belief in the possibility 
of improvement, and the possibility of improvement is closely bound to the notion of the 
efficacy of education.   
The evaluative view, in contrast, considers emotional education to be closely bound up 
with moral education.  Because cognitive appraisals are integral to emotions, the 
educator of emotions must address herself to her pupil’s beliefs, especially about 
matters of value. . . .  Those who subscribe to the evaluative view are also much more 
likely to view moral education as a matter of public concern.  The inculcation of 
correct values plays no necessary role in the mechanistic program, which purports to 
focus only on behavior.  But if the evaluative view is correct, then any program of 
emotional education that disregards moral belief is destined to fail. 
Id. at 298-300. 
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counts as a reasonable form of reliance might depend on the cultural 
context and the degree to which trust is encouraged; the degree to which 
trust is encouraged might, in turn, be a matter settled partly by the norms 
of morality and not merely by cultural customs. 42   
In other words, the law has the potential to guide and shape behavior.43[jjc1]   
The need for the law to serve an educational role is further underscored by the 
limitations of knowledge and risk-assessment that impair contracting parties.44  
Empirical studies have shown that prospective contracting parties tend to be overly 
and unrealistically optimistic of the potential outcome of transactions, and fail to 
fully understand or assess the risks involved.45  However, the law of Contracts is 
based on the principle that autonomous parties are fully capable of choosing and 
deciding their respective goals or wants, determining how to attain or obtain them, 
and accurately assessing the costs and benefits.46  In other words, the coherence of 
Contracts law depends on the ability of parties to make rational choices (or the 
ability of the law to assume rationality on the part of the actors).  Thus, it is in the 
law’s interest, and the interest of society’s reliance on law, to encourage people to 
make thoughtful, rational decisions and choices.  Promoting trust no matter what 
encourages the wrong, ill-advised sort of conduct that undermines the foundation of 
Contracts.  At a minimum, the law should at least refrain from encouraging 
inappropriate conduct (if it is too much to look to the law to promote appropriate 
conduct).     
Such aspirations are at odds with those who advocate the enforcement of 
promises without regard to whether the promisee’s trust or reliance is reasonable or 
desirable.  The problem with such a view is that it assumes all contracting parties 
possess a certain (high) level of information, wisdom, judgment and analytical 
ability, which leads them to make contracting decisions that should be enforced by 
the courts.  In a hypothetical world, promisees might possess all of these qualities in 
abundance, but the real world is populated by ordinary humans.47  If one accepts the 
                                                                
42Shiffrin, supra note 5, at 716. 
43Id. at 741 (“Namely, a great deal of morally virtuous behavior depends upon cultivating 
sound instincts and habits and allowing these to guide one’s behavior.”). 
44See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211, 211 (1995). Professor Eisenberg has described such limitations as “limits 
of cognition.”  Id.  
45Id. at 216,223. 
46Id. at 213. 
47See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1314-5 (1998). In a somewhat different context, Professor Knapp 
described these conflicting views in this manner: 
In one view of the world, things should function tidily.  People should think before 
they act, seek advice when out of their depth, know what they are getting into, read all 
documents, and write down all their agreements.  If they do not, the law will see that 
they suffer the consequences.  People may be hurt, but they—and others who learn of 
their misfortune—will profit from the experience, and the world will become tidier.  
The drawback of this approach is that it fails to recognize the human side of the law, 
the need for fairness.  If we expect formality every time, there is no humanity. 
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premise that contracting parties are subject to human mistakes, misjudgments, and 
miscalculations, then there may be a role for the law to guide and educate to help 
people to make better decisions and to develop better judgment.  Providing guidance 
concerning when, how and whom to trust might be one such role.  As stated by 
Professors Goetz and Scott:  “Appropriately calibrated enforcement rules can be used 
to achieve the optimal number and type of promises based on the degree and form of 
adaptation by promisor and promisee.”48 
D.  Additional Observations Concerning the Difference between Interpersonal Trust 
and Enforcement Trust 
As described, there is a difference between a promisee’s trust in the promisor as 
opposed to a promisee’s trust that the promise will be enforced.  In other words, a 
promisee may have no faith in the promisor, but may nonetheless rely on the promise 
because she knows and trusts that the law will enforce the promise.  Alternatively, a 
promisee may know that the promise is legally unenforceable, but relies on the 
promise anyway because she trusts the promisor to perform.  More likely is the 
scenario where the promisee has no idea whether the promise is enforceable or not 
(because she is not a lawyer), but relies on the promise because she trusts the 
promisor.   
This Article contends that trust in the promisor is more deserving of attention, for 
a couple of reasons.  First, it seems intuitively true that the universe of cases 
involving trust in the promisor is larger than the set of cases involving trust that the 
promise will be enforced.  “Enforcement reliance” cases require the involvement of a 
promisee who knows the difference between an enforceable versus an unenforceable 
promise—i.e., a sophisticated party.  A sophisticated party represented by lawyers 
will decide whether to trust the other party or not, but will also have a basis to know 
whether a promise can be enforced.  A less sophisticated party who is less familiar 
with the law will only have trust in the promisor as a basis for reliance.49   
                                                           
In the other view of the world, people screw up.  They grope their way through a 
complex and demanding world, doing the best they can, which is often not good 
enough, and they fall into traps.  When they do so, the law will examine the route they 
followed and the nature of the particular trap.  If the particular story is compelling 
enough, they will be rescued.  Whether others will also be rescued cannot be 
predicted—it is a function of how compelling their story is.  The drawback of this 
approach is that it fails to recognize the stable side of the law, the need for 
predictability.  If we look to context every time, there is no rule of law. 
Id.  
48Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of 
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1266 (1980).  The need for care and deliberation is necessary 
because “[c]ontracts enable persons who are not intimates nevertheless to cease to be 
strangers; and breaches do not just reinstate persons’ prior status as strangers but instead leave 
them actively estranged.”  Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 
1417, 1463 (2004). 
49See DeLong, supra note 3, at 996. Along these lines, Professor DeLong observed:  
“Indeed, the more legally sophisticated the parties are, the less reason a promisee has to infer 
consent from a non-bargain, informal commercial promise.”  Id.  He further noted,  “In light of 
common commercial practice, legally sophisticated commercial promisees have no reason to 
believe that a non-bargain promise made by a commercial promisor is legally enforceable in 
the absence of a manifested intention that it be so.”  Id. at 961. 
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More importantly, if the goal is to guide and inform the conduct of contracting 
parties, the analysis should focus on the point of interpersonal contact—the point 
where judgment is formed.  This is where the law can have the greatest effect in 
promoting beneficial behavior and discouraging self-destructive behavior.  Any 
attempt to promote trust in enforceability over interpersonal trust would likely push 
promisees toward conduct that should be avoided.  The reason is because trust in 
enforceability offers comparatively little reliability.50  By relying on the 
enforceability of a promise, a promisee is relying on the inherent uncertainties of the 
litigation process (including the indeterminacy of the law, the respective skill of her 
lawyer compared to opposing counsel, and the vagaries of judicial decision-making) 
and must be willing to delay certainty for the months or years it might take for the 
litigation process to work itself out.51   
In other words, encouraging trust in enforceability encourages promisees to place 
their trust in matters over which they have no control.  On the other hand, a promisee 
has complete control over whether she will trust a promisor or not.  By actively 
focusing on and guiding trust in the promisor, the law can play an educational and 
enriching role to help promisees avoid bad situations (which also would result in 
overall societal gains by the avoidance of resource-wasting transactions and 
lawsuits).   
IV.  THE ROLE OF TRUST IN PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
This is surely an obvious point, but the word “trust” appears nowhere in Section 
90.  It does not appear in the widely-accepted hornbook definition of promissory 
estoppel.52  It does not appear in the various state law formulations of the elements.53  
Nevertheless, the role of trust is an undeniable part of the doctrine.  “The principle 
that a trust reasonably reposed and voluntarily accepted should not be violated 
                                                                
50Moreover, parties enter into contracts with expectations of performance, not with 
expectations of enforcement.  To illustrate, Comment 1 to the Uniform Commercial Code 
section 2-609 makes the observation that “the essential purpose of a contract between 
commercial persons is actual performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for 
a promise plus the right to win a lawsuit . . . .” U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (2001).  
51This is admittedly a dark view of the nature of enforcement reliance, but this view is a 
luxury that can be held by one who lives in a society reliably governed and organized under 
the rule of law.  From a global, bird’s-eye perspective and in comparison to some other legal 
systems, there is no doubt that the American legal system is based on the rule of law, offers 
predictability, and is free of systemic corruption.  Despite these fundamental truths, a litigant 
can never be assured of any particular outcome, and this is why enforcement reliance is less 
than ideal. Nonetheless, it is indisputable that parties need to be able to trust in the 
enforcement of promises and contracts, especially at the fragile stage when a society is 
transitioning to a modern economy.  Even today, there are examples of countries being held 
back by the absence of a reliable judicial system. 
52See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 94-95 (4th ed. 2004). “First, there must have 
been a promise.  Second, the promisor must have had reason to expect reliance on the promise.  
Third, the promise must have induced such reliance.  Fourth, the circumstances must have 
been such that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Id.   
53See, e.g., Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (stating 
elements of promissory estoppel as:  “(1) a promise; (2) a detrimental reliance on such 
promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise”). 
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without remedy is a very old one; [S]ection 90 is but one of its formulations.”54  The 
role of trust in the doctrine is present and undeniable because of the requirement of 
reliance. 55  “Reliance doctrine is a means of affirming the existence of trust and co-
operation among the members of that community.”56    
Despite the existence and importance of trust, it should not be surprising that the 
doctrinal formulations focus on reliance rather than trust.57  Because of the internal, 
                                                                
54Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory 
Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 79 (1981).  See also Farber & Matheson, supra note 8, at 
928-2.  Professors Farber and Matheson added: 
Seen in this light, the cases in which courts have pushed the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel beyond its stated justification and technical limitations are characterized by a 
strong need both by the parties and society for a high level of trust.  They involve 
relationships in which one party must depend on the word of the other to engage in 
socially beneficial reliance.  In the employee cases, the socially beneficial reliance 
takes the form of higher job performance and lower turnover.  In subcontracting cases, 
that reliance takes the form of a more efficient bidding process in which general 
contractors are able to give bids directly reflecting the information they receive from 
subcontractors.  The point in these cases is not that reliance has taken place in a 
particular instance, but rather that reliance should be encouraged among participants in 
a class of activities.  To restate our initial observation, the role of reliance in 
establishing liability and determining damages in individual cases is on the decline—
but reliance, in the form of trust, is on the rise as the policy behind legal rules of 
promissory obligation. 
Id. 
55FARNSWORTH, supra note 52, at 95.  The plaintiff must show “actual reliance on the 
promise,” and the “reliance itself must be reasonable.”  Id. 
56Feinman, supra note 28, at 1386.  Trust could perhaps be viewed as the element that 
addresses a conundrum posed by another commentator. See Randy E. Barnett, The Richness of 
Contract Theory, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1423-24 (1999). 
But the problem for advocates of a "reliance theory" of promissory estoppel has 
always been distinguishing reasonable, justified, or foreseeable reliance from 
unreasonable, unjustified, or unforeseeable reliance, for no contracts theorist thinks 
that any and all detrimental reliance justifies a promissory estoppel claim.  In other 
words, in addition to a promise, the plaintiff needs "reliance [key]  something" to get a 
recovery under any reliance theory of promissory estoppel.  Whatever that 
"something" is, it cannot be reliance, which is present in any event.  Thus, all reliance 
theories of promissory estoppel require appeal to some factor apart from reliance to 
distinguish enforceable promises (which are accompanied by reliance) from 
unenforceable ones, and this is an element that reliance theorists have been 
unsuccessful in identifying.   
Id.  
Perhaps, the optimal amount of trust is the “reliance [key] something”.   However, any 
attempt by this Article, or any other, to exalt the role of trust should heed the following:  
“Commentators sometimes seem too zealous to find the ‘key’ element of one law or another 
and seem unwilling to admit how complex the law may be.”  Robert A. Hillman, Questioning 
the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 580, 619 (1998).  It is due to such caution that this Article favors an 
admittedly modest approach to the treatment of trust. 
57At one time, there was a school of thought that promissory estoppel did not require a 
showing of reliance.  “Despite the contrary position of leading commentators and both 
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subjective nature of trust, its existence can not be demonstrated and verified without 
something more.  Trust can only be observed and verified once it objectively 
manifests itself, and reliance is, of course, the objective manifestation of trust.  It is 
for this reason that it makes sense for the doctrine to focus on reliance.  It would 
have been more surprising if Section 90 had been drafted in terms of trust, rather 
than reliance, because that would have been inconsistent with the objective theory of 
contract.58    
V.  THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF TRUST 
Instead of protecting blind trust, the law should encourage and protect the 
optimal level of trust.59  In a persuasive display of sense and realism, Professors Hill 
and O’Hara stated: 
“[A]lthough there are situations where legal policy should work to either 
maximize or minimize interpersonal trust, in general, the law should seek 
to optimize interpersonal trust.  Individuals can be too trusting or not 
trusting enough.  Undertrust results in foregone beneficial opportunities, 
paranoia, and unnecessary tensions, but overtrust leads to ineffective 
monitoring, fraud, reduced efficiency and incompetence.  As with most 
problems in life and law, the challenge lies in finding the appropriate 
balance.60 
                                                           
Restatements, courts do not require actual inducement under Section 90.  Nor do they insist 
that the promisee suffer a detriment by relying on the promise.”  Yorio, supra note 35, at 152.  
Their article argued that “the prominence of reliance in the text of Section 90 and in the 
commentary on the section does not correspond to what courts do in fact.  Judges actually 
enforce promises rather than protect reliance in Section 90 cases.”  Id. at 111.  However, that 
assertion was quickly rebutted. See DeLong, supra note 3, at 1003.   
Many of the opinions reported in 1995 and 1996 lend support to the thesis that, in 
order to prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a commercial promisee must now 
demonstrate not only that her reliance was reasonable in light of the likelihood that the 
promisor would perform, but also that she had a reasonable belief that the promise was 
legally enforceable when made.   
Id.  See also Hillman, supra note 56, at 580-81. 
Contrary to the accepted wisdom, the data and analysis presented here (1) demonstrate 
that the theory seldom leads to victory in reported decisions, (2) underscore the 
immense importance of reliance as a substantive element of the theory, and (3) suggest 
the willingness of courts to grant reliance damages to successful litigants.   
Id. As a practical matter, it would seem highly unlikely that a plaintiff could survive a 
responsive pleading like a California demurrer or a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion without 
alleging reliance.  
58See  O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 324 (Little, Brown, and Company 1881).  
The law “necessarily ends in external standards not dependent on the actual consciousness of 
the individual.” Id. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 52, at 95.  “The standard for testing 
expectation [of reliance] is an objective one, under which the promisor is bound if the 
promisor had reason to expect reliance, even if the promisor did not in fact expect it.”  Id.  
59This is not a universal view. Compare  Hill & O’Hara, supra note 10, at 1719. “Scholars 
outside of the criminal law typically assert that trust should be maximized.” Id.  
60Id. at 1720 (emphasis added). 
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There is no dispute that promissory estoppel should protect a promisee’s trust and 
resulting reliance, but the more interesting issue is determining the level or amount 
of trust to protect.   
Those who advocate the view that a promise is a promise and that a promisee 
should be absolutely entitled to trust both the promisor and his promise suffer from 
an idealistic, perhaps naïve view.  People make promises for all sorts of reasons.  
Some promises are genuine and well-intentioned.  Others are fraudulent and 
designed to deceive.  Moreover, many promises are made, then regretted.  The regret 
can be due to miscalculation, imperfect information, misjudgment, or a variety of 
other reasons.  Given that promises are made by imperfect people laboring under 
imperfect conditions, there should be a role for the law to require the promisee to 
exercise some judgment and restraint before relying on the promise.  Otherwise, the 
law simply encourages promisees’ rash behavior and vulnerability. 
Other commentators have recognized the need to impose some sort of burden on 
promisees to exercise prudence and judgment before trusting the promisor. 
[T]he promisee might be aware that the promisor acted foolishly or 
without deliberation and that he may later regret having made the promise.  
It may then be unreasonable for the promisee to rely, at least without 
asking the promisor to do something that shows deliberation such as 
seeing a lawyer or making delivery.61 
By ignoring a promisee’s duty to guard her own interests, the law creates a moral 
hazard and encourages undesirable behavior.  A promise may be a promise, but those 
who attach moral significance and consequence to it should acknowledge a 
corresponding moral duty on the part of promisees to act in a responsible manner 
(assuming that one wants to view this issue through the lens of morality). 
The issue of the promisee’s own conduct can also be examined from an angle far 
removed from morality, the law and economics angle.62  If the law does not impose 
                                                                
61James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547, 581 (1995). See also Todd D. 
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1201 
(1983).  Along similar lines, Professor Rakoff made the following observation in the context 
of discussing adhesion contracts: 
Moreover, even assuming that adherents often do mean to express their trust in the 
drafting party’s good faith, we would still need to be shown that the law should 
respect that trust.  The law cannot unquestioningly uphold one person’s trust in 
another; that would legitimate a great many frauds.  Absent the elements of personal 
knowledge and intimate relationship that might lead us to respect one person’s 
decision to repose rather blind confidence in another, the adherent should be held to 
the consequences of his “assent” only if there is reason to believe that the drafting 
party will regularly provide fair and reasonable terms. 
Id. Excessive protection of trust also generates other types of negative effects.  “Legal 
regulation designed to deter bargaining opportunism could produce another undesirable side 
effect: encouraging parties who are overly cooperative or naïve to choose careers in business.”  
Shell, supra note 23, at 272. 
62See Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory 
Estoppel Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOR. 
L. REV. 531, 367 (2002). The broad application of law and economics to the doctrine was 
summed up by this commentator’s observation that the “scope of promissory estoppel in 
Contract and the success or failure of a promissory estoppel claim are determined by a desire 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
60 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:37 
any limits on trust, the result is overreliance on a promise.  Although stated in the 
context of examining expectation damages, the following definition of overreliance 
is helpful to this analysis:  “By overreliance, we mean reliance by a promisee that 
inefficiently disregards the promisor’s rate of breach or, to put it differently, that 
inefficiently treats the promisor’s performance as insured.”63  In other words, 
overreliance is about a promisee relying on a promise without adequately weighing 
whether the promisor should be trusted.  The view that a promise is a promise 
removes the burden from the promisee to analyze whether the promisor is reliable 
and trustworthy and/or capable of performance.  It encourages trust without analysis 
and without fear of consequences.  Simply put, it encourages promisees to enter 
transactions they should avoid.64   
This analysis begins with the following observation: 
In non-legal understanding, a promisee’s reliance on a promise can be 
defined as any choice she makes because of a belief that the promise will 
be performed under circumstances in which the performance of the 
promise will be beneficial to her interests or desires.  In the paradigmatic 
case, the promisee will be better off if she relies and the promise is 
performed, and worse off if she relies and the promise is breached, than 
she would be if she did not rely at all.  Given the uncertainty about 
whether the promise will be performed, therefore, a promisee who relies 
on a promise takes a risk in order to obtain a benefit.65 
The promisee’s position can be described in economic terms. 
Reliance is a form of “relation-specific investment.”  More specifically, it 
is any choice, be it action or inaction, which will (1) make S’s [the 
                                                           
to promote optimal interactions between a promisee and a promisor and to promote efficient 
reliance.”  Id. 
63Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the Theory of 
Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1335, 1339 (2002).  Professors Eisenberg and McDonnell 
made this observation in the context of discussing expectation damages:  “The theory is that 
the expectation measure insures the promisee’s reliance, and therefore may cause the promisee 
to overrely—that is, to invest more heavily in reliance than efficiency requires.”  Id. at 1335.  
See also Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 
494 (1996). On a similar note, Professor Craswell observed:  “In some cases, an enforceable 
commitment on the part of S may create the opposite problem by inducing B to choose more 
than the efficient level of reliance.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
64See, e.g., IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF 
MISREPRESENTED INTENT 64 (2005). This problem was recognized by Professors Ayres and 
Klass. 
The problem of creating the right incentives for optimal investment is a familiar one.  
It is commonly recognized that perfect expectations damages lead to inefficient 
promise reliance.  The problem is that perfect compensation does not require a 
promisee to internalize the costs of his behavior, since the promisor will pay those 
costs if she doesn’t perform.  Knowing that he will be fully covered in the case of 
nonperformance, the promisee has an incentive to underinvest in precautions against 
nonperformance (since he will be compensated for his losses in the case of breach). 
Id.  
65DeLong, supra note 3, at 952-53. 
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promisor’s] performance more valuable to B [the promisee] if S does in 
fact perform, but (2) make B worse off than if he had not relied if S fails 
to perform.  The second element of this definition means that reliance 
always involves some risk to the relying party.66 
Professor Craswell added: 
Since reliance involves both potential losses and potential gains, the 
efficient level of reliance—that is, the level of reliance that will maximize 
the total expected value of the proposed transaction—can be defined by 
the balance of the potential gains and losses.  More specifically, the 
efficient level of reliance depends on (1) the potential upside from the 
reliance, or the amount by which the reliance will increase B’s gain if S 
does perform; (2) the potential downside from the reliance, or the amount 
by which the reliance increases B’s losses if S fails to perform; and (3) the 
probability of each of these two outcomes (i.e., the probability that S will 
or will not perform).  Thus, the efficient level of reliance is determined by 
a sort of cost-benefit analysis, analogous to the “Learned Hand” test for 
defining the efficient level of precautions in a negligence case.67  
To put it another way, this cost-benefit analysis is one approach to calculate the 
optimal amount of reliance.  Whether or not one subscribes to the law and economics 
view of the world, it informs the analysis in this Article because of its pursuit of 
optimality. 
So, what is the optimal amount of trust that the law should protect?  This Article 
proposes a modest framework in response.  The protection of trust should be 
analyzed along a continuum.  One endpoint is defined by the cases where trust 
deserves maximum protection.  This endpoint includes cases where the promisee is 
engaged in a transaction that she cannot avoid, where she has no control over the 
structure of the transaction, and where she has no viable choice but to trust the 
promisor (or at least trust that the promise will be enforced).  It also includes cases 
where the parties have developed a long-standing, pre-existing relationship to the 
point where the promisee justifiably trusts that the promisor will act in a manner 
consistent with that relationship.  In such situations, the law should fully protect the 
promisee’s trust.   
The opposite endpoint is occupied by the cases where trust is misplaced and 
should not be protected.  This endpoint consists of instances involving a promisee 
who has entered into a transaction that she is not required to enter and where she has 
a choice as to whether and to what extent she should trust the promisor.  As a 
definitional matter, the type of transaction described would encompass almost every 
type of business, for-profit transaction.  No one is forced to seek a profit, and 
(typically) business people are not forced to trust the people on the other side of the 
bargaining table.  Admittedly, this is a large subset of transactions, and needs to be 
further defined to mark the endpoint.  Trust should not be protected if: (1) the 
promisee could have determined that the promisor was untrustworthy at a low cost to 
the promisee; or (2) if the promisee could have avoided the harm resulting from a 
                                                                
66Craswell, supra note 63, at 490. 
67Id. at 491. 
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broken promise by taking preventive measures that cost less than the amount of the 
harm.   Admittedly, there will be a large gray area separating the endpoints, and most 
cases that arise are probably located in this area.  Nonetheless, the setting of 
boundaries for the analysis through the use of these endpoints may be helpful.    
VI.  THE ENDPOINT DEFINING MAXIMUM PROTECTION OF TRUST 
Two types of cases present what can be viewed as easy situations for the 
protection of trust.  The first type of case involves situations where the promisee is 
engaged in a transaction that she cannot avoid, where she has no control over the 
structure of the transaction, and where she has no viable choice but to trust the 
promisor (or at least trust that the promise will be enforced).  The case of Ames v. 
Employers Casualty Co.68 illustrates this principle.  The second type of situation is 
where the parties have developed a long-standing, pre-existing relationship to the 
point where the promisee has developed a reasonable basis to trust that the promisor 
will act in a manner consistent with that relationship.  The case of D & G Stout, Inc. 
v. Bacardi Imports, Inc.69 illustrates this second principle.  
A.  Ames v. Employers Casualty Co. 
In Ames, the defendant was an insurance company that issued automobile 
liability policies.  Its insured was a J.W. Heldoorn who was covered under a policy 
that included liability insurance in favor of any person injured through the use of 
Heldoorn’s automobile.  Heldoorn collided with another automobile in which 
plaintiff Frank Ames was a passenger.  Ames, who was injured in the accident, sued 
Heldoorn and won a judgment against him.  The defendant insurance company 
refused to cover the loss on the ground that Heldoorn was driving the automobile for 
his personal use (which was allegedly not covered), as opposed to a business use 
(which was covered).  Heldoorn asserted that the defendant’s agent had represented 
that he was covered for all uses of his automobile.  Heldoorn won in the trial court, 
and the Court of Appeal affirmed.  It stated, “But where, as here, the insurer makes a 
promise to write a certain specific coverage, the insured is entitled to rely thereon 
and the insurer is estopped from taking a different position.”70     
Protection of trust and reliance is justifiable in these types of situations.  Anyone 
who owns an automobile is required by law to have a liability policy.71  The insured 
has no choice but to enter into a transaction with an insurance company; it is 
consensual only because the insured has the choice of selecting from more than one 
insurer.  The insurer also occupies a superior position of knowledge and bargaining 
(as evidenced by the prevailing use of adhesion contracts to bind consumers).  In the 
universe of consensual transactions, the promisee is at her most vulnerable in these 
types of situations.  She should be entitled to trust the promisor or trust the 
enforcement mechanism, and that trust should be protected by law. 
                                                                
6860 P.2d 347, 352 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936). 
69D & G Stout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imps, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1434 (N.D. Ind. 1992). 
70Ames, 60 P.2d at 352.   
71This Article does not represent that automobile insurance was mandatory in California at 
the time of Mr. Heldoorn’s accident.  The material point is that such insurance is mandatory 
today.   
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B.  Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Clark 
If Ames defines part of the endpoint, the case of Prudential Insurance Co. of 
America v. Clark72 lies just next to it.  In that case, Steve Clark was a young Marine 
who was killed in Vietnam when his helicopter crashed.  Before he was deployed, 
Clark purchased a life insurance policy issued by a Prudential competitor, which 
policy had no war risk or aviation exclusion clauses.  Prudential’s agent contacted 
Clark and urged him to drop the competitor’s policy and purchase a Prudential policy 
instead.  The agent represented that Prudential would issue the same type of 
coverage.  In reliance on the agent, Clark dropped his existing coverage and 
purchased a Prudential policy.  However, Prudential issued a policy that excluded 
coverage for death as a result of war or aviation accidents.  Clark had no opportunity 
to correct the mistake because he was in Vietnam.   
Clark’s parents submitted a claim under the Prudential policy.  Notwithstanding 
the exclusions, Prudential paid out $10,000 pursuant to the policy.  After Clark’s 
parents received the money, Prudential realized its mistake and demanded the return 
of the money on the grounds that Clark’s death was not covered under the policy.  
When the parents refused, Prudential sued them.  The Fifth Circuit ruled against 
Prudential and allowed the parents to keep the money.  In its decision, the court 
recognized the applicability of promissory estoppel to the parents’ defense. 
[Promissory estoppel] requires affirmative action indicative of a desire to 
be contractually bound.  In the case at bar, that affirmative action 
manifested itself when the agent, Brumell, promised to obtain a policy 
without the exclusion clauses and thereby induced Steve to drop his other 
policy in reliance upon that promise.73   
For purposes of the present analysis, the major difference between Ames and 
Clark is that, unlike automobile insurance, no one is required to purchase life 
insurance.  Nevertheless, the fact remains that the insured occupies the weak and 
vulnerable position when dealing with insurers, and the need of the weak and 
powerless to trust the stronger party and/or the enforcement mechanism should be 
protected.  Clark trusted Prudential’s agent to arrange the agreed upon policy.  
Promissory estoppel protected this trust. 
C.  Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 
If one accepts cases like Ames and Clark as marking the endpoint where trust 
should be protected, a case like Drennan v. Star Paving Co.74 can be analyzed to 
determine where it lies along the continuum.  Under this analysis, it occupies a point 
closer to the midpoint of the continuum but still within the half of the continuum 
where trust should be protected.  The defendant subcontractor submitted a bid in the 
amount of $7,131.60 for paving work to the plaintiff general contractor.  The 
plaintiff relied on this bid in preparing his own bid for work on a school project, and 
was awarded the contract.  Afterward, the defendant told the plaintiff that it had 
                                                                
72Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark, 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972). 
73Id. at 936. 
74Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). 
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made a mistake in computing its bid for the subcontract and that it could not do the 
work for less than $15,000. 
Justice Traynor’s opinion upheld the right of the general contractor to rely on the 
subcontractor’s bid, and cited Section 90 to support the Court’s ruling.   
Plaintiff testified that it was customary in that area for general contractors 
to receive the bids of subcontractors by telephone on the day set for 
bidding and to rely on them in computing their own bids.  Thus on that 
day plaintiff's secretary, Mrs. Johnson, received by telephone between 
fifty and seventy-five subcontractors' bids for various parts of the school 
job.  As each bid came in, she wrote it on a special form, which she 
brought into plaintiff's office.  He then posted it on a master cost sheet 
setting forth the names and bids of all subcontractors.  His own bid had to 
include the names of subcontractors who were to perform one-half of one 
per cent or more of the construction work, and he had also to provide a 
bidder's bond of ten per cent of his total bid of $317,385 as a guarantee 
that he would enter the contract if awarded the work.   
Late in the afternoon, Mrs. Johnson had a telephone conversation with 
Kenneth R. Hoon, an estimator for defendant.  He gave his name and 
telephone number and stated that he was bidding for defendant for the 
paving work at the Monte Vista School according to plans and 
specifications and that his bid was $7,131.60.  At Mrs. Johnson's request 
he repeated his bid.  Plaintiff listened to the bid over an extension 
telephone in his office and posted it on the master sheet after receiving the 
bid form from Mrs. Johnson.  Defendant's was the lowest bid for the 
paving.75    
These facts are significant because the business practice forced the general contractor 
to trust and rely on the subcontractor’s bid.  Given the nature of the bidding process 
and the relationship between general contractors and subcontractors, there was no 
realistic alternative business practice for the parties.  Either the parties conducted 
themselves in the described manner or the parties did not do business at all.  In this 
sense, a general contractor and the subcontractors are roughly analogous to an 
insured and her insurer.  The circumstances and structure of the transaction force the 
promisee to trust the promisor.  Under such circumstances, the trust should be 
protected.   
D.  D & G Stout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imports, Inc. 
A second type of situation where trust should be protected is where the parties 
have developed a long-standing, pre-existing relationship to the point where the 
promisee has developed a reasonable basis to trust that the promisor will act in a 
manner consistent with that relationship.76  In D & G Stout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imports, 
                                                                
75Id. at 758. 
76See Farber & Matheson, supra note 8, at 925. This point is consistent with the following 
observation by Professors Farber and Matheson: 
Two factors appear to coalesce in cases in which promissory obligation has been 
expanded beyond its traditional boundaries.  First, as suggested above, the promisor's 
primary motive for making the promise is typically to obtain an economic benefit.  
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Inc.,77 the plaintiff was a wholesale distributor of liquor in Indiana.  At the start of 
1987, plaintiff was a distributor for four major suppliers including Bacardi Imports, 
Inc., the defendant (“Bacardi”).  As the year progressed, however, the plaintiff’s 
future as a profitable business was placed in doubt when two of its major suppliers 
terminated their relationship with the plaintiff (for reasons unrelated to performance).  
This left the plaintiff with only two major suppliers (Bacardi and Hiram Walker) and 
one minor supplier (Canandaguia).  Due to the loss of the major suppliers, the 
plaintiff was forced to evaluate a variety of options, including going out of business.  
It determined, however, that it could remain a profitable business if it could retain its 
three remaining suppliers, and downsize its operations.  It also concluded that it 
would be forced out of business if it lost another supplier.  Given this precarious 
situation, the plaintiff sought verbal commitments of its relationships with its 
suppliers, and obtained such commitments from Hiram Walker and Canandaguia.78 
On July 9, 1987, plaintiff attended a meeting with several Bacardi representatives 
to discuss a variety of topics.  Bacardi had its own concerns about the plaintiff’s 
continuing viability, and inquired into the plaintiff’s condition and prospects.  The 
plaintiff told Bacardi that it could stay in business as long as it maintained its three 
remaining suppliers, and sought Bacardi’s assurance that Bacardi would remain a 
supplier.  The plaintiff made clear that Bacardi’s continued business was necessary 
for the plaintiff’s future.  Bacardi’s vice-president of marketing responded by telling 
the plaintiff not to worry.  He assured the plaintiff that if it continued to meet 
Bacardi’s sales expectations and if there were no changes in market conditions, 
plaintiff would remain a Bacardi distributor.79 
After this meeting, the plaintiff nonetheless pursued negotiations with another 
distributor regarding the sale of all of its assets to the other distributor.  By the end of 
July, however, the plaintiff decided to remain in business for itself, based on its 
belief that Bacardi would remain a supplier.  Bacardi, on the other hand, continued to 
harbor doubts about the plaintiff’s viability.  On July 30, Bacardi informed the 
plaintiff that their relationship would terminate at the end of the year.  Realizing that 
it could not remain in business, the plaintiff revived the negotiations with the other 
distributor for the sale of its assets.  But given the dramatic change in circumstances, 
the plaintiff lost whatever leverage it had in prior negotiations.  As a result, the 
plaintiff sold its assets for $1.956 million in August.  If it had concluded the 
negotiations in July, it would have received $3.109 million.80 
The plaintiff sued Bacardi under a theory of promissory estoppel, and won.  The 
basic fact of the case was that “Bacardi simply changed its mind, and [the plaintiff] 
                                                           
Second, the enforced promises generally occur in the context of a relationship that is 
or is expected to be ongoing rather than in the context of a discrete transaction.  These 
relationships are characterized by a need for a high level of mutual confidence and 
trust. 
Id. 
77D & G Stout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imps, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1434 (N.D. Ind. 1992).  
78Id. at  1437-38. 
79Id. at 1438-39. 
80Id. at 1439-44. 
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was not unreasonable in failing to anticipate that.”81  The crucial part of the court’s 
decision was the following: 
As emphasized throughout the trial, the liquor distribution business 
traditionally had operated on an informal basis.  Long term relationships 
were formed based on nothing more than a handshake.  Bacardi and [the 
plaintiff] had done business in this environment for years to the 
satisfaction of both, making it all the more reasonable for Bacardi to have 
expected [the plaintiff] to rely on Bacardi’s word, and for [the plaintiff] to 
actually rely on it.  By 1987, the market was in the midst of a wholesale 
change, not only in terms of the number of players and the names of those 
players, but in the way in which business was done.  Nothing in the 
changes sweeping the liquor market, however, suggested that the old rules 
were out the window, particularly with respect to a relationship of such 
long standing.82   
The plaintiff trusted Bacardi, and made a crucial business decision based on that 
trust.  Given the long-standing relationship between the parties and the nature of 
their dealings with each other over time, the plaintiff had reasonably developed a 
trust in Bacardi.  Under such circumstances, trust should be protected. 
Bacardi did not involve a rash decision based on an isolated encounter.  The 
parties’ relationship and expectations developed over years, in accordance with the 
common practice of their industry.  This is the way trust between contracting parties 
should develop, and trust developed in this manner deserves maximum legal 
protection. 
VII.  THE ENDPOINT WHERE TRUST SHOULD NOT BE PROTECTED 
At the opposite end of the spectrum lie the cases where trust should not be 
protected, and indeed should be discouraged.  The challenge here is to identify the 
criteria for such cases.  To this end, the discussion will turn to what may be the most 
wrongly decided promissory estoppel case ever (in this author’s opinion, of course): 
Universal Computer Systems, Inc. v. Medical Services Ass’n of Pennsylvania.83 
A.  Universal Computer Systems, Inc. v. Medical Services Ass’n of Pennsylvania. 
In July 1975, the defendant Medical Services Association of Pennsylvania 
(referred to as “Blue Shield” in the opinion) solicited bids for the lease of a 
computer.  Plaintiff Universal Computer Systems, Inc. (“Universal”) prepared a bid 
proposal.  Blue Shield was located in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, which is 
approximately 3.5 miles from Harrisburg.  Universal was located in Westport, 
Connecticut.  The solicitation required that bids be received by Blue Shield no later 
than noon on Monday, August 18, 1975 at Harrisburg.  Joel Gebert, a Blue Shield 
employee, served as the liaison between Blue Shield and all prospective bidders.  On 
or about August 15, the president of Universal, Warren Wilson, called Gebert to tell 
                                                                
81Id. at 1449. 
82Id. at 1451. 
83Universal Computer Sys. v. Med. Servs. Ass’n of Pa., 628 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1980), 
reversing Universal Computer Sys, Inc. v. Med. Servs. Ass’n of Pa., 474 F.Supp. 472 (M.D. 
Pa. 1979). 
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him that Universal would be sending a bid on an Allegheny Airlines flight to 
Harrisburg.  He asked if Gebert could arrange for someone to pick up the bid at the 
Harrisburg airport on Monday morning.  Gebert assured Wilson that the bid would 
be picked up and brought to Blue Shield by the deadline.  On the 18th of August, 
Universal dispatched its bid, and Wilson called Gebert again that morning to give 
him further information.  Gebert, however, informed Wilson that he had changed his 
mind and that the bid would not be picked up at the airport.  Universal was unable to 
make alternative, timely arrangements for delivery of its bid to Blue Shield.  Blue 
Shield rejected the bid as untimely.84   
Universal sued Blue Shield and the jury returned a verdict in the amount of 
$13,000 against Blue Shield.  The jury found that Universal would have won the 
contract if its bid had been timely, and the amount represented Universal’s lost 
profits under the contract.  The trial court granted Blue Shield’s motion for judgment 
non obstante veredicto, and Universal appealed.  The appellate court reversed the 
order granting j.n.o.v. and remanded the case with directions to reinstate the jury’s 
verdict.  In so ruling, the Third Circuit held that Universal had established its right to 
recovery under promissory estoppel.85  “Here it is clear that plaintiff incurred a 
substantial detriment as a result of relying upon defendant’s promise.  Plaintiff has 
suffered an injustice in being deprived of the service promised by Blue Shield’s 
employee, Gebert.”86      
At its core, this case is about the fact that Universal’s agent trusted Blue Shield’s 
agent.  The existence of trust and reliance is undisputed.  The Third Circuit chose to 
protect this trust (even though the trial judge thought it did not deserve protection).87  
But why did this trust deserve protection?  Should it have deserved protection?  And 
what does this case say to anyone else in Universal’s position?  This Article submits 
that the case was wrongly decided.  The trust should not have been protected.  The 
Third Circuit should have gone the other way to explicitly discourage trust in this 
type of situation.           
A key fact should be noted.  There is nothing in the record to show or even 
suggest that there were ever any prior dealings between Wilson and Gebert, or Blue 
Shield and Universal.  The only fair reading of the case leads to the conclusion that 
Wilson and Gebert spoke for the first time ever on August 15, 1975, and that this 
was the first time Blue Shield and Universal had attempted to do business with each 
other.  In other words, the two people and the two businesses involved were 
complete strangers to one another prior to August 15.  Moreover, there is no answer 
in either the appellate or trial court opinion to any of the following questions:  What 
did Wilson know about Gebert’s personal trustworthiness?  What did Wilson know 
about Gebert’s personal ability to arrange the pick-up?  What did Wilson know about 
Gebert’s authority or power within Blue Shield to arrange or order the pick-up?  
What did Wilson know about Gebert’s work demands that might interfere with 
Gebert’s ability to arrange the pick-up?  Because none of these factual issues is 
addressed in the two opinions, a reasonable inference is that these facts were either 
                                                                
84 Universal Computer Sys., 628 F.2d at 822. 
85 Id. at 825. 
86Id.  
87 Id.  
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not developed in discovery or not presented at trial.  Despite the stated and missing 
facts, the Third Circuit held that Wilson acted reasonably in trusting Gebert.88  
Should the law encourage people to trust complete strangers?  
For those who would cite a moral prescription or societal benefits to justify the 
Third Circuit’s decision, there are equal or more compelling reasons based on the 
same grounds to reach the opposite conclusion.  Trust should be the product of care 
and deliberation.  It is difficult to identify the moral or societal justifications for the 
protection of casual encounters with strangers.89 
From the framework of an economic analysis approach, the Universal Computer 
decision is difficult to justify.  The quantitative downside to Universal’s trust was 
$13,000, the amount of the lost profits from the contract.90  This amount merits 
examination in some context.  How much would it have cost Universal to avoid this 
loss?  The facts of the case state that the bid was placed on an 8:30 a.m. flight from 
LaGuardia to Harrisburg.  Suppose Universal had arranged for a paralegal (say, from 
one of its local law firms) to start the day at 7:00 a.m.  Starting at that time, the 
paralegal could proceed with package to the airport, fly to Harrisburg, deliver the 
bid, and return to New York by 5:00 p.m.  That would represent a total of 10 hours 
of paralegal billable time.  Additional costs would include the cost of airfare and 
local transportation.  In 1975, a paralegal might have been billed at $25 per hour (as 
a very rough estimate), and the roundtrip airfare might have cost $250.  Add in a 
generous $50 for local transportation, and the total cost of delivery of the bid might 
have been roughly $550.  For $550, Universal could have avoided a $13,000 loss.91   
                                                                
88Id. at 824. It also clear from the record that it was not the usual business practice for bids 
to be handled in the manner described.  The trial court’s opinion emphasized the fact that the 
bidding process was governed by federal procurement regulations, and that such regulations 
prohibited any preference or favoritism in the process.    The trial court ruled that picking up 
the bid at the airport would have violated the regulations.  It also held that Universal knew or 
should have known about the regulations, and concluded that Universal’s reliance was 
unjustified.  The Third Circuit, however, disagreed, and ruled that it was error for the trial 
court to rule that Universal should have been aware of the regulations. 
Quite apart from the legal effect of the regulations, the Third Circuit’s decision can be 
viewed as an encouragement of the type of business conduct described.  It is another 
matter entirely, though, whether any such conduct should be encouraged.  Based on a 
lengthy career in the world of big law firm practice, the author would guess that any 
junior lawyer who missed a deadline by trusting someone other than the firm’s hired 
agent to file a document in court or with a regulatory agency would quickly find 
himself or herself unemployed. 
89And what about Gebert?  Critics of this Article may argue that Gebert’s perfidy should 
be punished.  To those who are quick to conclude that there was bad faith in Gebert’s conduct, 
it is equally plausible that Gebert was simply trying to be an accommodating, nice guy to a 
stranger asking for a favor.  Unfortunately, he had committed himself to do something that he 
was unable to do (possibly for reasons out of his control).  Gebert may be a living example of 
the maxim, “No good deed goes unpunished.” 
90 Universal Computer Sys., 628 F.2d at 825. 
91This hypothetical utilizes a paralegal to contrast it with the fact that Universal ultimately 
resorted to a law firm after the damage had been done.  The point is to illustrate that an ounce 
of prevention is worth a pound of cure. 
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Instead of approaching it this way, the Third Circuit said it was right for 
Universal to trust a stranger, take the risk of a $13,000 loss, hire a lawyer to seek 
recovery, and then bear the uncertainties of litigation and trial, when Universal could 
have avoided the whole mess for about $550.  Economic efficiency analysis under 
the law and economics approach may not provide the answer to every legal problem, 
but it certainly suggests a compelling result here.    
For those who favor this kind of analysis, it suggests a formula to evaluate 
promissory estoppel cases.  Where the cost of self-reliance or self-protection is less 
than the potential quantitative downside resulting from misplaced trust, the law 
perhaps should not protect trust and instead encourage self-reliance.92  Going back to 
the Universal case, suppose it would have cost Universal $13,000 to arrange delivery 
of its bid to Harrisburg.  Under those hypothetical facts, it is at least understandable 
(from an economics point of view) why Universal would trust Blue Shield to take 
care of the delivery.  This formula could also explain (in part) cases like Ames, Clark 
and D & G Stout.  In each of those cases, the promisee was in no position to engage 
in self-reliance.  The promisees in those cases were at the mercy of their promisors.  
Given those circumstances, the cost of their self-reliance would be closer to infinity 
rather than to zero, and therefore the cost of self-reliance or self-protection greatly 
exceeded the potential downside.93 
                                                                
92A similar approach was proposed by Professor Gordley, who wrote: 
A second thesis of this Article is that courts enforce such promises because they can 
be performed without significant cost to the promisor. . . . [T]hese promises raise 
neither the fear that the promisor acted foolishly to his detriment, nor that the 
exchange was unfair.  Moreover, the enforcement of these promises is desirable 
because, nearly always, while the promisor can confer the benefit at a negligible cost, 
the promisee either cannot obtain the benefit otherwise or can do so only at a 
significantly greater cost. 
Gordley, supra note 61, at 582.   
Also along somewhat similar lines, Professor Katz proposed: 
In the foregoing examples, my suggested rule of thumb generally implies holding 
large, informed, wealthy repeat players to their precontractual offers and 
representations, while excusing small, uninformed, liquidity-constrained novices from 
theirs. This favoring of weak parties over strong ones comports with the traditional 
norms of equity out of which the estoppel doctrine originally grew and may for some 
readers seem appealing for that reason. It is important to remember, however, that my 
analysis here is not focused on distributional fairness, but on allocative efficiency. 
Whether or not it is fairer to favor weak parties over strong ones, it is necessary to do 
so in order to give the weak appropriate incentives to make reliance investments—
investments that increase the social value of exchange for strong and weak alike. It is 
in the private interests of the strong to enter into contractual arrangements whereby 
they bind themselves not to use their bargaining power to expropriate the investments 
of the weak. Who is strong and who is weak, however, and whose investment 
incentives need protection, may be a matter for individualized and decentralized 
determination. 
Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in 
Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1302 (1996). 
93Any ex ante use of this formulation may require the amount of potential downside to be 
adjusted by the probability of the loss occurring so that amount of potential downside 
represents an expected value.  If, for example, there had been a fifty-fifty chance that Blue 
Shield would not pick up the Universal delivery, the potential downside would equal .5 x 
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In other words, there are some transactions where the cost of self-protection or 
self-reliance is so high that it is not economically feasible to engage in such 
measures.  In such circumstances, there are only two choices—avoid the transaction 
or trust.  This stark, “either/or” choice demonstrates why seeking the optimum level 
of trust protection should be the aim of the law.  The law should not encourage or 
protect ill-advised behavior or poor judgment, but the law also should not stifle 
beneficial activity.  If the law does not protect the optimal level of trust, the set of 
avoided transactions will certainly include transactions that would have otherwise 
benefited the promisee and society as a whole.  This is the reason why trust should 
be protected where self-reliance or self-protection exceeds the potential downside.94    
The utility of this formulation lies in its analysis of the enforceability of promises 
through the prism of the promisee’s calculations.95  Such an approach makes sense as 
                                                           
$13,000 or $6,500, which would still be significantly greater than the $550 cost of self-
reliance.  Even if the risk of Blue Shield’s failure had been an unrealistically low 10%, the 
potential downside would have equaled .1 x $13,000 or $1,300.  Thus, even if Universal could 
have counted on a 90% chance of reliability, it still would have made more sense to arrange 
for its own delivery (and it is baffling why anyone would assign such a high probability of 
reliability to a complete stranger). 
94This need for the protection of trust was recognized by one commentator who wrote: 
Courts seem more willing to apply promissory estoppel where significant barriers 
prevent the negotiation of an explicitly reciprocal contract because, in such cases, 
permitting an estoppel claim may be the most efficient means of fostering reliance and 
increasing gains from trade.  It seems appropriate to apply promissory estoppel when 
private bargains may be unlikely to arise and yet it would seem optimal for the 
reliance to be protected. 
Kostritsky, supra note 62, at 577-78.  
95Other commentators have engaged in compelling economic analyses of the enforcement 
issue by focusing on the promisor.  For example, Prof. DeLong wrote:  “Rational commercial 
promisors will make non-bargain promises only when their expected benefit from the 
promisee’s anticipated reliance exceeds the expected cost of making the promise, including 
the expected cost of performance and any potential liability for breach.”  DeLong, supra note 
3, at 952. 
In fact, the scholarship on promissory estoppel seems to have been marked by pendulum-
type swings from articles focusing on the promisor to articles focusing on the promisee, with 
the Farber and Matheson article representing a high point of promisor-focused scholarship.  
The following passage evidences another example. 
The critical and difficult question about Section 90 in the courts is not whether to 
protect reliance, but whether to enforce the promise at issue.  It is neither sufficient nor 
necessary that the promise induce the promisee to rely to her detriment.  Every 
promise may influence the promisee's behavior, and yet not every relied-upon promise 
is enforceable.  What distinguishes enforceable from unenforceable promises is the 
quality of the commitment made by the promisor. 
Yorio, supra note 35, at 162.  Professors Yorio and Thel continued: 
Courts enforce promises under Section 90 when they view the promises as serious and 
deserving of enforcement qua promise; they do not enforce them out of solicitude for 
promisees.  The promisor's commitment may be shown to be sufficiently serious by 
her contemplation of particular and substantial reliance, by the formality of the 
promise, by the situation of the promisee, or by a chance of benefit to the promisor.  
The importance to courts of promise explains why the remedy for breach of a Section 
90 promise is invariably expectancy relief (if measurable); why the absence of 
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a matter of economic analysis.  “[B]ecause a promisee can control reliance costs 
more easily than can a promisor, the risk of detrimental reliance is lower if borne by 
the promisee rather than the promisor.”96    
This type of cost-benefit analysis also suggests an alternative way to view 
Universal’s decision.  This alternative confirms that Universal made a rational 
business decision by trusting Blue Shield, but still leads to the conclusion that the 
Third Circuit was wrong.  Under this analysis, Universal may have made the 
following calculation:  The potential profit from the contract is $13,000, but the 
chance of winning the bid is only 5% so the expected value is $650.  It will cost 
about $550 to arrange for delivery, but that will almost wipe out the expected value 
of winning.  At that point, it almost makes no sense to bid.  That cost, however, can 
be eliminated by trusting and relying on Blue Shield to pick up the bid at the airport. 
If this thinking reflects the decision-making process, it would have been a 
perfectly rational decision for Universal to trust Blue Shield.  It is difficult to 
criticize that business judgment.  The economy looks to business executives to make 
those sorts of decisions.  However, it is one thing to recognize a good business 
decision, but it is another thing entirely for the state to guarantee the desired result if 
events do not turn out as planned.  Universal may have made a perfectly sound 
judgment, but things do not always turn out well.  The risk of the downside is always 
present, and a major part of any business executive’s job is risk management.  
Despite best efforts and best-laid plans, things happen and the downside becomes 
real.  But that is business, and the state does not ordinarily intercede to unwind the 
loss after things go bad.  However, that is exactly what the Third Circuit did.  The 
Third Circuit exercised its power to save Universal from a business decision that did 
not turn out as hoped.97    
It should be noted that this Article’s view of the Universal case is not shared by 
others.  In particular, the Farber and Matheson article points to this case as an 
                                                           
inducement and detriment is irrelevant; why some promises are not enforced despite 
detrimental reliance; and why the outcome (in terms of both liability and remedy) 
generally turns on some aspect of promise. 
Id. at 166. 
96Goetz, supra note 48, at 1295. 
Critics may point out that the proposed formulation only takes into account the potential 
downside of trust and fails to incorporate the potential upside.  It fails to do so because it is a 
natural and universal tendency for promisees to incorporate the potential upside into their 
analyses.  The problem seems to be a reluctance to consider the downside risks.  The point is 
that promisees will only trust and rely if the cost to do so is less than the potential upside.  
This calculation is so obvious and embedded that most promisees probably engage in this 
calculation at an almost subconscious level.  Focusing on downside and risk, on the other 
hand, probably comes less naturally, and that is why the formulation focuses on that aspect of 
trust.   
97This point is not intended to provoke a political debate with those who may favor strong 
state involvement and intervention in the market.  But even those who disagree with this 
Article’s point of view would probably agree that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is 
probably not the ideal mechanism to achieve their goals.  
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exemplar of correct promissory estoppel analysis.98  There is obviously considerable 
room for disagreement over the wisdom of the decision.99 
                                                                
98Farber & Matheson, supra note 8, at 930-932.  That article proposed a hypothetical 
Restatement (Third) of Contracts, complete with comment and illustrations.  It proposed a new 
Section 71A: 
§ 71.  Enforceability of Commercial Promises   
A promise is enforceable when made in furtherance of an economic activity.  
Comment: 
a. Rationale and relation to other rules.  This section deals with what has traditionally 
been called consideration—namely, the legal conclusion that a promise is enforceable.  
Prior rules tested every promise or modification to determine whether the promise was 
conditioned on some tangible bargained-for exchange.  The present section eliminates 
the need for finding a specific bargained-for promise or performance for each promise 
or modification.  Rather, the key determination is whether the promise is designed to 
induce the creation of or to aid in the continuation of economic activity.  The rule 
posits the social and economic utility of promises made in furtherance of economic 
activity. 
. . . . 
Illustrations:  
. . . .  
4. Corporation A prepared a bid for leasing a computer to Corporation B.  A was 
running behind schedule and asked an agent of B to pick up the bid at the airport. The 
agent, after agreeing to pick up the bid, declined to do so and the bid arrived too late 
for consideration.  Assuming the agent acted within his actual or apparent authority, B 
is bound by the agent's representation.  If A can show that it would have been awarded 
the lease, it can recover lost profits.”  
Id.  Illustration 4 is, of course, based on the Universal case.  See id. at 932 n.103.  
99The reasoning underlying the Farber and Matheson article’s approval of the Universal 
case and the role of the courts in protecting trust is reflected in the work of other leading 
scholars.  For example, Professor Hillman proposed the following hypothetical problem and 
solution. 
Problem 3:  MDM Enterprises produces the television series “Why Spy?” for XYZ 
Television Network and later begins negotiations with XYZ for the production of a 
spin-off series, “Journey.”  The parties tentatively agree on a licensing fee of $750,000 
per episode for twenty-two episodes of the new series.  They discuss a five-year 
license, with the network to have the right to cancel at any time.  They also discuss a 
ten percent escalation of the licensing fee over the five-year period.  Before signing 
any documents or reaching a final agreement on any terms, the network offers MDM 
$1.5 million to produce two episodes of “Journey.”  Without accepting XYZ’s offer, 
MDM produces the episodes at a cost of $1 million.  Thereafter, negotiations over the 
full deal break down.  MDM seeks $1.5 million in compensation when no other 
network shows interest in the new series. 
We will see in Problem 3 that MDM may recover under the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel even though MDM and XYZ have not signed a contract for the production of 
“Journey,” and MDM did not formally accept XYZ’s offer to purchase two episodes 
of the series. 
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The problem with Universal is that the court, in effect, made Blue Shield the 
guarantors of Universal’s success even though Blue Shield received nothing in return 
and even though Universal could have protected itself at minimal cost.  This was 
certainly a case of court-enforced “overinsurance” as described by Professors Goetz 
and Scott, who wrote:  “Legally mandated ‘overinsurance’ induces a moral hazard 
because the promisee will not exercise optimal self-protection.”100  The court further 
ignored the following principles:   
Whatever the reasons for the riskiness attached to the performance 
prospects of any promise, the promisee can protect himself against 
prospective losses from detrimental reliance by limiting his behavior 
adjustments.  In practice, the attempt to do this is frequently manifested in 
intermediate courses of action taken by promisees who do not completely 
ignore the implications of a promise in their planning but do not react as 
fully as if performance were certain.101 
Universal was a sophisticated party that could (and should) have protected itself.  
Yet, the court ignored that reality. 
B.  Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 
The issue of overreliance and ill-considered conduct on the part of promisees can 
be further developed by an examination of one of the best known promissory 
estoppel cases, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.102 Joseph Hoffman wanted to 
acquire a Red Owl grocery store franchise.  Red Owl assured him that he would be 
granted one if he took certain steps to gain experience in the business and if he 
invested $18,000 into the franchise.  Over the course of more than two years, 
Hoffman relied on Red Owl’s assurances by selling his bakery, and by buying, 
operating and then selling a smaller grocery store in another town to gain experience.  
After all this, Red Owl increased the required $18,000 investment amount to 
$24,100, increased it again to $26,000, and increased it yet again to $34,000.  
Hoffman was unable to come up with the increased amount, and Red Owl never 
granted him a franchise.  Hoffman sued and won on a promissory estoppel theory.  
                                                           
ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS Of CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF 
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 48-49 (1997). 
The issue here is why should the courts protect MDM’s decision?  Under the terms of the 
hypothetical, it appears that MDM made a business decision to proceed with the production of 
“Journey” without a contract in hand.  The motivation for the decision would likely be a desire 
to test the market to see if there are higher bidders for the project, with assumption of the risk 
that nothing turns up.  When things do not turn out well for MDM, why should the court 
protect it from the consequences of its decision?  Moreover, by asserting promissory estoppel, 
MDM converted XYZ’s offer into an irrevocable option even though that was never XYZ’s 
intent (with MDM using the option period to shop its project around town).  This does not 
appear to be a simple matter of trust and reliance by the promisee.  Rather, it looks like 
opportunistic conduct by MDM.   
100Goetz, supra note 48, at 1285. 
101Id. at 1270. 
102Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). 
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The innocent, blameless victim of a broken promise prevailed.  This is the accepted 
story. 
However, a recent re-examination of Hoffman v. Red Owl requires a fundamental 
re-thinking of the case.103  According to Professor Scott, the key to understanding the 
actual events in that case lies in Hoffman’s statement that he had $18,000 in cash to 
invest in the franchise.104  Hoffman alleged that Red Owl assured him that was all he 
would need to invest.  The real story emerges through the following questions: 
What was the understanding as to the composition of the $18,000?  Was it 
supposed to be all equity, or was it to be cash composed of some equity 
and some debt?  If the latter, from what sources was Hoffman to obtain 
his encumbered cash?  Finally, how reasonable was Red Owl’s reaction to 
the changing sources of Hoffman’s prospective $18,000 contribution as he 
moved his assets around between September 1961 and January of 1962?105 
It turns out that Hoffman was unable to answer these questions, and that is where 
the problem was.  Hoffman assumed that his $18,000 contribution could be 
composed of equity and borrowed cash, but Red Owl was looking for a pure equity 
contribution.106  The basic problem was that Red Owl was focused on the amount of 
pure equity, while Hoffman was focused on the amount of cash he would need 
regardless of whether it was borrowed or not.  In fact, a substantial portion of 
Hoffman’s cash was borrowed, and this explains why Red Owl’s required 
contribution changed.107  When it realized that Hoffman was looking to invest 
borrowed cash, Red Owl had to change the structure of the transaction to ensure that 
the level of equity contribution remained the same.  In other words, the crucial 
number in Red Owl’s eyes – the amount of pure equity – remained substantially 
unchanged throughout the negotiations.    
At a basic level, Hoffman did not understand the transaction he was trying to 
negotiate.  So, whose fault is that?  Some might be quick to blame the big, heartless 
corporation who took advantage of the weaker party.  This makes no sense, however.  
Hoffman initiated contact with Red Owl, not the other way around.  Plus, what 
possible benefit did Red Owl gain by not granting the franchise?  Some might also 
argue that Red Owl had some sort of duty or obligation to better inform Hoffman of 
what was required.  However, the law of Contracts does not require a party to 
educate or provide business schooling to the person on the other side of the table.   
Hoffman apparently trusted and relied on the various Red Owl representatives 
with whom he dealt.  But on what was his trust based?  It appears to have been 
based, in large part, on his own misunderstandings regarding the deal he sought.  
With this new re-examination, it appears that Hoffman bears a great deal of the 
responsibility for the failed outcome of his efforts.  Therefore, the Hoffman case may 
not be a shining example of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
                                                                
103See Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual 
Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2007). 
104 Id. 
105Id. at 75.   
106Id.  
107Id. 
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Referring back to the continuum along which trust should be enforced, it appears 
that the Hoffman case lies closer to the Universal case and that the court should not 
have protected Hoffman’s trust and reliance.  Should the law protect those who 
develop their trust based on their own misjudgments and poor information?  If the 
law were to do so, it would certainly remove incentives to form better judgments and 
obtain better information.  That would hardly improve moral posture or advance 
societal goals.  With regard to the formula comparing the cost of self-reliance or self-
protection to the potential downside, Hoffman’s downside could be measured as 
$10,600, the amount of his settlement after the decision.108  Compared to this 
amount, how much would it have cost to obtain the advice of an accountant or 
business lawyer at the outset of negotiations?  In the early 1960’s, one would 
suppose that $500 would have purchased sufficient advice (at least enough advice to 
point out the difference between debt and equity).  Thus, for $500, Hoffman could 
have saved himself from a considerable amount of personal difficulty, lost time and 
financial loss.  It seems that the law should encourage that kind of conduct, as 
opposed to misplaced or poorly formed trust.         
C.  A Fanciful Hypothetical 
The promisee’s responsibility in response to a promise can be further illustrated 
by the following hypothetical.  Ms. Trusting owns a horse farm.  Mr. Slick enters 
into a contract to purchase an abandoned meat processing plant in town.  Mr. Slick is 
new to the area.  Neither Ms. Trusting nor anyone else in town has ever met or heard 
of Mr. Slick.  Mr. Slick drives into town in his Hummer, leaves $100 tips for the 
waitresses at the diner, and tells everyone he meets about his big plans to export pork 
products to overseas markets.  The townsfolk are eager to hear about his plans 
because the town has been in decline for many years, and is sorely in need of 
economic development.  One day, Mr. Slick sees Ms. Trusting in the diner and takes 
her aside.  “You know, my plant’s gonna need product.  Now, you’re probably 
wondering what’s this got to do with you.  Here’s the deal.  You could start raising 
pigs on your farm, and I’ll buy your supply of pigs once my plant is ready to open in 
fourteen months.  I’ll pay top dollar, and I’ll guarantee to buy from you for ten 
years.”  For Ms. Trusting, this is the deal of a lifetime because the cost of raising 
horses has exceeded her revenues for a few years, and she immediately accepts the 
offer.  Upon hearing her acceptance, Mr. Slick turns to everyone in the diner and 
yells out, “I just locked in my first supply of pigs!  Ms. Trusting is gonna be one of 
my pig suppliers!”  The other diners cheer at the good news of even more business 
activity in their town. 
Although Ms. Trusting is trusting by nature, even she wonders whether she 
should get Mr. Slick’s promise in writing.  But she decides that Mr. Slick must have 
been serious because he announced the deal to everyone in town.  Plus, the big story 
on the front page of her local newspaper was about the new law of promissory 
estoppel and how all promises in furtherance of economic activity were now 
enforceable.  Armed with this knowledge, Ms. Trusting starts raising pigs on her 
farm.   
A little over a year later, she contacts Mr. Slick who has since returned to the 
other side of the country.  At first, Ms. Trusting has to remind Mr. Slick who she is.  
                                                                
108Id. at 98.   
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The conversation then goes from bad to worse, and Mr. Slick denies any obligation 
to buy any pigs.  Unfortunately for Ms. Trusting, the market value of her farm has 
dropped considerably because no one wants to own a pig farm.109  Ms. Trusting 
therefore sues Mr. Slick in the local court.  She loses on her breach of contract theory 
because the promise is unenforceable due to the Statute of Frauds.110  However, she 
prevails on her claim under a promissory estoppel theory, and wins judgment on the 
promise.  However, Ms. Trusting learns that Mr. Slick is judgment-proof. 
Several scenarios can account for why Mr. Slick made his promise. 
1. Mr. Slick is a convicted felon who lies and cheats for a living.  He 
duped gullible investors to give him millions of dollars to invest in his 
project.  He would bring the investors to town, show them the pigs on 
Ms. Trusting’s property, and offer that as proof that the project was 
underway and on track.  The investors’ money was gambled away in 
Vegas; or 
2. Mr. Slick is a starry-eyed optimist who comes up with one pie-in-the-
sky scheme after another.  He always believes he is just one deal away 
from the big-time.  The pork processing plant was just the latest scheme 
that amounted to nothing.  His business plans, such as they are, are an 
exercise in hope and hype.  Despite his delusions, he honestly thought 
the plant would be his ticket to fortune, and he honestly thought that he 
was doing Ms. Trusting a favor by offering her a way to participate in 
the project.  As Mr. Slick likes to say, “you can’t blame a guy for 
trying;” or 
3. Mr. Slick is an honest, hard-headed businessman, but a very bad one.  
He completely miscalculated the demand for pork in foreign markets, 
and miscalculated the cost of financing the project.  As a result, he was 
unable to convince any lenders to finance the project.   
Because of Ms. Trusting’s inherent nature and because she knew of the laws in her 
state designed to maximize trust in business transactions, Ms. Trusting never did any 
due diligence before starting a pig farm.  Suppose, however, any person could have 
learned any one of the following facts from a search of public records at minimal 
cost: 
a) Mr. Slick had two prior felony convictions for embezzlement 
and wire fraud. 
b) Local zoning ordinances did not permit the operation of a meat 
processing plant, and it would take at least two years to get a 
decision on the proposed use with no assurance of a favorable 
outcome. 
c) A town in the next county was already one year into the 
development of a competing pork processing plant, and a study 
by a local college showed that the area could only support one. 
 
                                                                
109For those unfamiliar with pig farming, the smell is ever-present and overpowering.  
This hypothetical was constructed this way as a reminder that it will often be the promisee 
alone who must live with the consequences of the broken promise.  
110U.C.C. § 2-201 (2001) (or the one-year provision of the Statute of Frauds, if the U.C.C. 
does not apply for some reason).  
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Under facts like these, should the law concern itself solely with the promisor’s 
wrongful or misguided conduct, without any questions raised about the promisee’s 
own involvement in the matter?  What purpose is served by leaving the promisee’s 
conduct unexamined?  As fanciful as this hypothetical may be, the world has an 
abundant share of Mr. Slicks, and it seems that all would be better served if the Ms. 
Trustings of the world were encouraged to protect themselves.  Any movement 
toward exalting trust, no matter what, would undermine this encouragement.     
This hypothetical also illustrates the difference between reasonable reliance and 
optimal trust.  A panel of judges, like the ones in the Universal case, might view Ms. 
Trusting’s reliance as reasonable.  After all, Mr. Slick had a contract to purchase the 
meat processing plant, and projected the appearance of (flashy) success.  It would 
also be no problem to prove the promise because of all the eyewitnesses in the diner.  
These facts could arguably support a finding of reasonableness.  However, should 
Ms. Trusting have trusted Mr. Slick?  Is that the level of trust the law should 
encourage or protect?  Would any competent lawyer have advised Ms. Trusting to 
trust Mr. Slick?  The important point is that an ex post judicial inquiry into whether 
reliance was reasonable is something entirely different from an individual’s ex ante 
decision to trust.  
This Article does not suggest that the courts have overlooked the promisee’s 
conduct.  However, it seems there has been a tendency in the courts and the scholarly 
literature to focus more on the promisor’s conduct.  This observation does not imply 
that such a focus is misplaced.  If anything, the promisor’s conduct is more inviting 
for examination and interesting because it often involves morally reprehensible 
conduct.111  A couple of notable instances where the court did focus on the 
promisee’s conduct add more texture to the understanding of the protection of trust. 
D.  James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. 
It is instructive to examine the case often regarded as the companion to 
Drennan—James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.112  Just like its California counterpart, 
Gimbel Bros. involved a subcontractor who withdrew a mistakenly-computed bid 
submitted to a general contractor.  Just like Drennan, James Baird Co. relied on the 
subcontractor’s bid and was awarded the general contract.  Unlike Drennan, 
however, Judge Learned Hand refused to protect the general contractor’s trust and 
reliance.  Indeed, the judge was keen to criticize the promisee’s conduct in the 
transaction.  “The contractors had a ready escape from their difficulty by insisting 
upon a contract before they used the figures; and in commercial transactions it does 
not in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do 
not protect themselves.”113 
With all due respect to Judge Hand, he got it wrong and Justice Traynor got it 
right.114  If it can be assumed that the nature of contractor-subcontractor interactions 
                                                                
111For example, Professor Kostritsky identified the presence of opportunistic conduct by 
the promisor as a key element in successful promissory estoppel cases.  See Kostritsky, supra 
note 62, at 542.  
112James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). 
113Id. at 346. 
114Subsequent case law made this clear.   
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for Pennsylvania projects in the 1930’s was similar to California projects in the 
1950’s, the use of the analysis comparing the cost of self-reliance to the potential 
downside would weigh against the result in Gimbel Bros.  Given the need for speed 
and informality in the bid submission process, it would be impractical for a 
contractor to gum up the process by insisting on and negotiating a formal contract, as 
Judge Hand would require.  Such self-help or self-reliance would add crippling costs 
to the transaction in the form of lost time, managerial distraction, and perhaps 
attorneys’ fees to the point where cost of self-protection would outweigh the 
potential downside.  Thus, it would be unreasonable to expect a contractor to act in 
the manner demanded by Judge Hand.  If that were the law, the contractor might not 
have any choice, except to cease business. 
E.  Marker v. Preferred Fire Insurance Co. 
Another example of a court looking at the promisee’s conduct was in the case 
often regarded as a companion to Clark—Marker v. Preferred Fire Insurance Co.115  
Clinton Marker was a lawyer and a licensed agent of the Preferred Fire Insurance 
Company, the defendant.  In other words, the plaintiff was one of the defendant’s 
insurance agents.  Marker owned real property in Topeka, which was destroyed by a 
tornado on June 8, 1966.  The property had been insured for this type of loss under a 
policy issued by the defendant, but the policy had expired on February 27, 1966.  
The lawsuit arose out of the circumstances surrounding the failure to renew the 
policy. 
In late 1965, Marker was in the process of purchasing the property and became 
aware of the fact that the policy at issue was due to expire in February 1966.  
However, Marker expressly instructed the agent who had arranged the coverage (a 
Mr. Johnson, who was also a co-defendant) not to renew the policy.  Marker told 
Johnson that he (Marker) would take care of the renewal (the reason for the 
instruction was apparently related to the commission).  Marker alleged that Johnson 
had promised him that he (Johnson) would remind Marker of the expiration date.  
Marker alleged that Johnson failed to do so, and that is why the policy was not 
renewed (even though Marker was in actual possession of the policy which stated the 
expiration date).  Marker sought recovery under a theory of promissory estoppel (in 
addition to breach of contract).  The court rejected all of Marker’s arguments and 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor. 
Also we again wish to stress the fact that Marker was an attorney and was 
himself a licensed agent for Preferred Fire Insurance Company. . . . The 
terms of the policy were always within the knowledge of the plaintiff and 
if he failed to remember that the policy expired at a certain time before the 
                                                           
Traynor's analysis in Drennan won out over Hand's analysis in Baird in subsequent 
contractor-subcontractor cases.  More importantly, however, the drafters of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts subsequently adopted and extended the logic of 
Drennan. Restatement (Second) section 87(2) today provides that “[a]n offer which 
the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial 
character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid 
injustice." 
Katz, supra note 92, at 1263. 
115Marker v. Preferred Fire Ins. Co., 506 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1973). 
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tornado, it was his own negligence and not that of Johnson which 
prevented the plaintiff from renewing his policy.116  
Even though Marker and Clark both involved a failure to arrange promised 
insurance coverage, the different nature of the plaintiffs led (correctly) to opposite 
conclusions.117  In terms of the comparison of the cost of self-protection to the 
potential downside, the cost of self-protection for Marker was almost negligible due 
to the fact that he was both a lawyer and an agent for the defendant.  His situation 
was unlike Clark’s, who was in no position to exercise feasible self-reliance or self-
protection.  
F.  The Role of Lawyers Concerning Promisee Self-Reliance 
So how does one exercise self-reliance or self-protection?  Marker points to one 
method: the hiring of a lawyer.  The fact that Marker was a lawyer was a crucial 
factor in the decision.  It was important, of course, because Marker was in a position 
to protect himself.  Thus, in determining the cost of self-reliance or self-protection, a 
helpful question is to ask whether the promisee should have hired a lawyer.  In Red 
Owl, as discussed, Hoffman could probably have avoided his loss by spending a 
modest amount on professional advice.  The use of lawyers was also alluded to in 
Gimbel Bros. when Judge Hand sharply criticized the plaintiff for not protecting 
itself.118  This was likely Judge Hand’s way of saying that the plaintiff should have 
hired a lawyer.  
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the law should refrain from 
protecting trust if a promisee fails to hire a lawyer.  The inquiry should focus on 
whether the nature of transaction allows for the hiring of a lawyer, and, if the answer 
is yes, then on whether the promisee should have hired a lawyer.  Clark and Drennan 
illustrate this analytical process.  In the typical insured-insurer situation, the cost of 
the transaction would be prohibitive if the insured is required to hire a lawyer to 
protect her interest.  The economics of insurance purchase would be so costly for the 
insured that the only rational decision would be not to obtain insurance.  In the 
subcontractor-contractor situation, the lack of available time in the bidding process is 
one reason why it would not be feasible for the contractor to protect itself by hiring 
counsel.  In sum, the law should respect the real world constraints of common 
transactions and recognize that there are severe limits to which a promisee can 
                                                                
116Id. at 1170. 
117This is certainly not an original observation. 
The different results in Clark and Marker were determined not so much by differences 
in the ways the doctrine was applied as by differences in the ways the underlying facts 
were perceived—differences that placed the cases in disparate “situation-types.”  A 
key distinction was the difference in the characteristics of the respective insureds.  
Clark involved an unsophisticated insured who relied on the representations of a 
commercially responsible agent.  The court understood Marker to involve commercial 
parties of equal stature and the offer of a gratuitous courtesy by Johnson.  In the 
courts' views, the facts demanded liability in the first case but not in the second. 
Jay N. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 702 
(1984). 
118 James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933). 
43Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
80 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:37 
protect herself in certain transactions.  In such instances, it would be foolish to 
require the promisee to hire a lawyer. 
In other transactions, however, protecting oneself by hiring a lawyer would be 
the prudent course of action, and the law should refrain from protecting those who do 
not take that step.119  As mentioned, the Red Owl case represents a situation where 
promisee would have been well-served by hiring a lawyer or an accountant.  It 
follows that claims for promissory estoppel should face particularly tough scrutiny 
when the promisee is (or should have been) represented by counsel, and the courts 
have recognized legal representation as an important factor in cases where such 
claims have been denied.120   
                                                                
119A reader may wonder why the Bacardi case does not fall into the category where the 
promisee should have hired a lawyer.  After all, the promisee was a sophisticated business 
entity with ample resources and was in discussions concerning its continued existence.  That 
sounds like a situation where the court should have criticized the promisee for not protecting 
itself. 
This Article submits, however, that the promisee acted rationally and prudently by not 
bringing a lawyer into the situation.  The promisee had a long-standing, pre-existing 
relationship with Bacardi in which mutual actions were taken and decisions made in an 
informal manner without the involvement of lawyers.  This is the context out of which the 
trust developed.  If the promisee had brought a lawyer into this situation, it would have been 
tantamount to a declaration that it did not trust Bacardi and that the existing relationship had 
moved to a different, more unfriendly level—an escalation in tension, in other words.  The risk 
of jeopardizing and irreparably harming the relationship with Bacardi was too great. 
As Professor Hillman observed: 
Business people are usually comfortable with their contracting partners, familiar with 
the subject matter of their deals, and eager to do additional business in the future.  
They believe that deals should be honored and that “legalese”—symbolizes distrust 
and selfishness.  Business people also want to establish and maintain good reputations.  
They are therefore generally content with informal arrangements. 
HILLMAN, supra note 99, at 243 (emphasis added). 
120See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Taco Tico Acquisition Corp., 454 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1995).  In that case, Taco Tico attempted to acquire the Del Taco restaurant business.  
The parties executed a non-binding letter of intent and a management services agreement 
under which Taco Tico actually began operating the Del Taco business pending 
consummation of the transaction.  Circumstances changed, however, and the transaction fell 
apart.  Taco Tico sued on several theories.  One of its claims asserted promissory estoppel 
because the seller had represented that the transaction would be completed.  The court rejected 
the claims.  It noted that the letter of intent expressly stated that neither party may rely on any 
representations made by the other party regarding whether the transaction would be 
consummated.  It therefore ruled that, as a matter of law, Taco Tico could not have reasonably 
relied upon any alleged representations by Del Taco, and ordered that a directed verdict be 
entered against Taco Tico. 
In this appeal, both parties to the negotiations were experienced, successful 
businessmen who were advised by capable attorneys.  Therefore, it cannot be 
reasonably maintained that they did not comprehend the terms of the letter of intent 
that they signed or that they did not understand the possibility that the transaction 
would not be completed.  Under these circumstances, Taco Tico cannot avoid the 
responsibility for its actions taken in preparation for the acquisition of Del Taco based 
on the assumption that the transaction would be completed. 
Id. at 791. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
There are, of course, obvious disadvantages to anything less than maximum 
protection of trust.  Identifying the type of trust that should be protected from the 
type that should not is a difficult task with no clear guidelines yielding consistent 
results.  As noted by two scholars: 
But the problem is quite simply that policies that reduce the reliability of 
promises are likely to reduce both beneficial and detrimental reliance.  
Thus, legal rules that encourage self-protective adaptation by the promisee 
achieve desired reductions in detrimental reliance only at the cost of 
concomitant reductions in beneficial reliance.121 
Moreover, the approach seems to give free rein to the “bad man” to lie and 
mislead.122  After another of his broken promises, he would say, “You trusted me?  
That is entirely your problem.  You should have known better.”  The advocates of 
expansive trust protection would argue that such a policy is necessary to protect the 
virtuous from the bad man. 
Unless, however, the law can legislate away the existence of bad promisors, the 
law should pursue a complete approach to the problem of bad promises by also 
encouraging promisees to avoid them.  There are simply numerous types of promises 
that should not be relied upon and transactions that should not be pursued.  In many 
such instances, the promisee will be the party who is in a better position to avoid the 
situation.123    
                                                                
121Goetz, supra note 48, at 1271. 
122This is a reference to Holmes’ “bad man.” 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who 
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to 
predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law 
or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. 
Holmes, supra note 39, at 459. 
The “bad man” was one of the concerns of the Farber and Matheson article.  “Rather, promises 
are enforced in order to foster a society in which people can confidently rely on each other.  
Such a society is morally superior to the state of constrained avarice depicted by ‘bad man’ 
theories of legal obligation.”  Farber & Matheson, supra note 8, at 942. 
123These principles are also consistent with sound legal practice. 
This seems as good a place as any to point out that the promisee might also be relying 
on her knowledge of a rule of law, in this case the rule of promissory estoppel.  This is 
a difficult factor to assess.  On the one hand, [S]ection 90 has been around at least 
since 1932 (citations omitted).  One might with justification take the position that 
reliance on these rules is no less reasonable or significant than reliance on the rules of 
non-liability, such as the consideration requirement or the rules of form.  But there is a 
problem here, nonetheless.  It is one thing to counsel a client, “If you can get the other 
party to sign a formal ‘contract,' you will probably be protected.”  It is—at least it 
seems to me to be—a different thing to counsel the client, “You should go ahead and 
rely on the promise that was made to you, because  then you will be protected.”  I have 
never advised a client in these circumstances, but given the risks involved, it has 
always seemed to me that I would counsel the promisee to change position only if she 
would do so anyway, because of her trust in the promisor—not just for the sake of 
binding someone to a promise that she fears may not be performed, and could not 
otherwise be enforced.  I have refrained from putting forth the promisee's conscious 
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To this end, this Article has proposed a framework to protect trust to a certain 
degree and yet promote self-reliance and self-protection.  The overall approach is to 
recognize and honor existing business practices in order to avoid a situation where 
the law forces contracting parties to act in ways inconsistent with the actual realities 
and restraints of transactions. 124  Within this general framework, however, the law 
can act to inform the analysis and process by which trust develops. 
                                                           
reliance on [S]ection 90 (or some other similar rule) as an independent argument for 
enforcement in this discussion, because a main thrust of my argument is that 
individuals rely on promises not primarily (if at all) because of their expectations of 
legal enforceability, but because of their expectations of performance. 
Knapp, Rescuing Reliance, supra note 47, at 1294 n.420. 
On a similar note, another commentator observed: 
Second, proving the existence of such passive, subtle reliance or the amount of 
damage suffered was “administratively baffling,” and something to be avoided.  
Indeed, Llewellyn contended that the problems of proving substantial reliance meant 
that businesspeople should not build their transactions with it in mind.  He pointed out 
that it would be folly for an attorney to advise a client to rely on an otherwise 
unenforceable agreement, because if the court found insufficient proof of reliance, the 
client would be out a considerable sum. 
Michael Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article 2 of the U.C.C., and the Restatement (Third) of 
Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 659, 673 (1988).   
124This approach is like the following. 
Novices in business, such as the franchise applicants in Hoffman, may not know the 
formal legal doctrines, and more experienced parties, such as the general contractor in 
Drennan, may view legal doctrine as subordinate to prevailing social norms or 
business exigencies. For both kinds of parties, these norms and exigencies may 
constitute the real conventions in force.  In this view, because offerors know about and 
knowingly benefit from offerees' reliance on such social and business understandings, 
it would be unfair to allow one party to evade the obligations of such understandings 
while it reaps the benefits of the other's compliance. Rather than trying to preserve the 
elegant and official conventions that parties do not really use, the law should try to 
reflect the messy but realistic conventions that the parties do actually follow. 
Katz, supra note 92, at 1265. 
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